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render the sale valid under the statute must be open, notorious
and unequivocal. * * * The statute being a local one, applying only to sales in Missouri, the court will follow the construction given to it by the highest court of the state." And
in Robinson v. Elliott, 22 Wall. 513, where the question arose under
a chattel mortgage in Indiana, and the statute of the state was
relied on, the court took great pains to ascertain the construction
of the statute in that state, and Mr. Justice DAvis says, in the
opinion, "Although we have been unable to find any case from
Indiana of similar facts with the one at bar, yet the decision in
the .NewAlbany Insurance Co. v. Wilcoxson, 21 Ind. 355, would
seem to imply, that when such a case did arise, it would be decided
in accordance with the views we have presented," and the court in
its judgment, was governed by the tendency of the state court.
N. D. M.
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STATE v. TATRO.
The application of the common law rule, that a criminal offence is neither excused
nor mitigated by the voluntary intoxication of the person who commits it, in trials

for murder, is not affected by No. 44, Acts of 1869, making degrees of murder.
Thus, where it appears on trial for mnrder that the murder was done by some
kind of wilful, deliberate, and premeditated killing other than by means of poison
or by lying in wait, the degree of the offence is not lessened by proof that at the

time it was committed the respondent was intoxicated, any more than it would
be if it had been perpetrated by means of poison or by lying in wait.
INDICTMENT

for the murder of Alice Butler, on the evening of

June 2d 1876. At about 7 o'clock in the evening of the day of
the alleged murder, Charles Butler, the husband of the murdered
woman, left his house to go to a neighboring village, leaving behind
the respondent, who was then at work for him, as he had been at
intervals for two or three years before that time. On entering his
house on his return at about 9 o'clock, he found the dead body of
his wife lying on the floor, with marks of blows from some heavy
instrument on the head.
The evidence on the part of the respondent tended to show that
at the time of the alleged murder, the respondent was laboring
under delirium tremens, acute mania, or some form of delirium
resulting from excessive use of alcoholic drink, whereby he was
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rendered incapable of premeditating, or forming a design ; and
expert testimony was introduced as to the nature and effects of
delirium tremens.
The respondent requested the court to charge that if at the time
of the commission of the act in question, the respondent was so
far under the influence of intoxicating liquor as to be in a condition bordering on delirium tremens, and was unable to premeditate
or form a design, malice could not be implied from the use of the
deadly weapon with which the act was committed; that if he was
so intoxicated as to be possessed of a mania, and was unable to
deliberate or form an intent, then the act would be excusable homicide, or manslaughter at the most; and that malice could not be
implied from the use of a deadly weapon, unless it was used with
deliberation and not in the heat of passion.
The court charged that under the act of 1869, all murder perpetrated by means of poison or by lying in walt, or by any other
kind of wilful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, &c., should
be deemed murder in the first degree, and charged appropriately
as to what under that act constituted other degrees of murder.
The court also charged that an insane person was not punishable
for his criminal acts; that insanity consisted in the incapacity to
distinguish between right and wrong as to the act charged, and that
in the eye of the law a person in the paroxysms of delirium tremens
was insane. The court then called attention to the expert testimony
upon the subject of that disease. Upon the question of intoxication as an excuse, the court charged as follows:
"The voluntary intoxication of one who without provocation
commits a homicide, although amounting to a frenzy, that is,
although the intoxication amounts to a frenzy, does not excuse him
from the same construction of his conduct, and the same legal inferences upon the question of premeditation and intent, as affecting
the grade of his crime, which are applicable to a person entirely
sober. * * * I don't want to be misunderstood about this, and
shall therefore repeat what I consider to be the law upon this
point, that is, that if a party gets so intoxicated that he is crazy
drunk, that it amounts to a frenzy, so that he does not know what
he is doing, and if in such a condition he should commit a crime,
'which, if committed by a sober man would be murder, it is equally
murder in the man that is thus drunk."
Verdict, guilty of murder in the first degree.
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G. A. Ballard, Willard FParrington,and

. IF Mcaettrick,

for the respondent.-The charge upon the question of intoxication
was to. the effect that the jury had no right to consider or weigh it
in determining the degree of the crime; that a man who became
voluntarily intoxicated, so that he did not know what he was doing,
was not allowed to have that fact affect the grade of his crime,
although he could not know, deliberate, or meditate upon the act
before committing it. That was erroneous. State v. Johnson,
40 Conn. 136; People v. DoJell, 48 Cal. 85; Jones v. Common-

wealth, 75 Penna. St. 403; 1 Am. Crim. Law, s. 41; 3 Greenl.
Bv., s. 148; 15 Am. Law Reg. 505. The court having charged
that there was no express malice, the respondent could not be convicted of murder in the first degree. State v. Johnson, 40 Conn.
136; s. c. 41 Conn. 584.
ff. B. Start, state's attorney, and if. S. Royce, for the state.The charge upon the subject of the effect of the intoxication of
the respondent was correct: The People v. Rogers, 18 N. Y. 9,
27, and cases there cited; 1 Am Crim. Law, ss. 38, 41; Smith
v. Wilcox, 47 Vt. 537; 2 Greenl. Ev. 374.
The opinion of the court was delivered.by
REDFIELD, J.--[After noticing some points as to the jurors and
the evidence, not of general interest.] The more important question arises upon the charge of the court upon the effect of intoxication upon the grade of the offence. The court charged the
jury that voluntary intoxication could .neither excuse nor mitigate the offence. There is, perhaps, no principle or maxim of the
common law of England more uniformly adhered to than that
voluntary drunkenness does not excuse or palliate crime. Lord
CoKE, in his Institutes, declares that "whatever hurt or ill he
doeth, his drunkenness doth aggravate it:" 3 Thomas's Coke
Lit. 46. And in his reports, Beverley's Case, 4 Coke 123 b,
125 a, he says: "Although he that is drunk is for the time non
compos mentis, yet his drunkenness does not extenuate his act,
or offence, nor turn to his avail." And Sir MATTHEW HALE,
eminent alike for his humanity and learning, says of drunkenness, which he calls dementia affectata: "This vice doth deprive men of the use of reason, and puts many men in a perfect
but temporary frenzy; * * but by the laws of England, such a
person shall have no privileges by his voluntary contracted mad-
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ness, but shall have the same judgment as if he were in his right
senses." And Lord BAcON, in his "Maxims of the Law," (Rule
5), in that comprehensive language which clearly defines and gives
the reasons for the rule of law, thus asserts the doctrine: "If a
madman commit a felony, he shall not lose his life for it, because
his infirmity came by act of God; but if a drunken man commit a
felony, he shall not be excused, because the imperfection came by
his own default." In Burrow's Case, Lewin 75, A. D. 1828, HoLROTYD, J., thus defines the rule: "It is a maxim in the law that if
a man gets himself intoxicated he is answerable to the consequences, and is not excusable on account of any crime he may commit when infuriated by liquor, provided he was previously in a fit
state of reason to know right from wrong." And the cases of Rex
v. Gridley and Rex v. lenkin, 7 C. & P. 297, show the uniformity
of this rule in the courts of England. In the case of The People
v. Rogers, 18 N. Y. 9, the Supreme Court had reversed the conviction of Rogers on the ground that the court had excluded the evidence of the respondent's drunkenness, as affecting the criminal
intent. But the case was, by writ of error, carried to the Court of
Appeals, and the whole law upon that subject was reviewed and
canvassed with great learning and ability by Chief Justice DENIO
and HARRIS, J. HARRIS, J., says: "The Supreme Court seem
to have understood that in all cases where without it the law would
impute to the act a criminal intent, drunkenness may be available
to disprove such intent. I am not aware that such a doctrine has
before been asserted. It is certainly not sound. The adjudications
upon the subject, both in England and this country, are numerous,
and characterized by a singular uniformity of language and doctrine. They all agree that where the act of killing is unequivocal
and unprovoked, the fact that it was committed while the perpetrator was intoxicated cannot be allowed to affect the legal character
of the crime." But it is insisted that under the statute which
makes "degrees" of murder, drunkenness qualifies and mitigates
the higher offence. The statute declares that "all murder which
shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or
any other kind of deliberate and premeditated killing, * * shall
be deemed murder in the first degree." The same or similar statute
has been enacted in most of the states. And many courts have
allowed drunkenness to be shown in mitigation of the higher offence. In the case of State v. Jzekson, 40 Conn. 186, the court
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held that intoxication, as tending to show that the prisoner was
incapable of deliberation,might be given in evidence. Chief Justice
SE.YmouR dissented, and FOSTER, J., who tried the case below, did
not sit, so that the four judges constituting the court were, in fact,
equally divided. The same case came before that court again in 41
Conn. 584, and the opinion was delivered by the same judge. The
court were hard pressed with the former opinion in the same case,
and that it had taken a departure from the common law. But the
court repelled the intimation, and declared that "we have enunciated no such doctrine," but "held on a trial for murder in first
degree, which under our statute requires actual express malice, the
jury might and should take into consideration the fact of intoxication, as tending to show that such malice did not exist." And, in
the same opinion, the judge says: "Malice may be implied from
the circumstances of the homicide. If a drunken man take the life
of another, unaccompanied with circumstances of provocation or
justification, the jury will be warranted in finding the existence of
malice, though no express malice is proved. Intoxication, which is
itself a crime against society, combines with the act of killing, and
the evil intent to take life which necessarily accompanies it, and all
together afford sufficient grounds for implying malice. Intoxication, therefore, so far from disproving malice, is itself a circumstance from which malice may be implied. We wish, therefore, to
reiterate the doctrine emphatically, that drunkenness is no excuse
for crime and we trust it will be a long time before the contrary
doctrine, which will be so convenient to criminals and evil-disposed
persons, will receive the sanction of this court." This reasoning
seems to us both illogical and incongruous. To constitute murder
of the first degree, the act must, indeed, be done with malice aforethought. And that malice must be actual, not construetive. At common law, if the accused shoot his neighbor's fowls, and by accident
kill the owner, he is guilty of murder, yet he did not intend to
murder but to steal. Such cases are excluded by the statute from
the definition of murder in the first degree. But "where the act
is committed deliberately, with a deadly weapon, and is likely to be
attended with dangerous consequences, the malice requisite to murder will be presumed; for the law infers that the natural and probable effect of any act deliberately done was intended by its actor :"
2 Am. Crim. Law, s.944. "And intent for an instant before the
blow, is sufficient to constitute malice :" Id. 948. It will be ad-
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mitted that if the respondentlhad killed his victim "by poison, or
lying in wait," the act would have been murder in the first degree,
and the fact that he was intoxicated could not have been admitted
to excuse or palliate the crime. Yet it, is claimed that if the circumstances show that the murder was deliberately planned, and executed with fiendish barbarity and malice, drunkenness may come
in to palliate the crime.
This, we think, is making a distinction without a difference.
Chief Justice HORNBLowFu, 1 Am. Crim. Law, s. 1103, speaking
of the New Jersey statute, which is like ours, says: "This statute
in my opinion, does not alter the law of murder in the least respect.
What was murder before its passage is murder now-what is murder now was murder before that statute was passed. It has only
changed the punishment of the murderer in certain cases: or
rather, it prescribes that, in certain specified modes of committing
murder, the punishment shall be death, and in all other kinds of
murder the convict shall be punished by imprisonment."
The evidence, so far as detailed in this case, if believed, shows a
murder most fiendish and shocking. He destroyed the last resisting vitality of this woman, struggling for her life, with an axe,
which shows malice and malignity of purpose. . The language of
Chief Justice McKEi, while discussing a like statute in Pennsylvania, and in a case quite similar to this, is fitting and sensible.
He says: "It has been objected that the amendment of our penal
code renders premeditationan indisputable ingredient to constitute
murder in the first-degree. But still it must be allowed that the
intention remains, as much as ever, the true criterion of crime,
in law as well as in ethics; and the intention of the party can only
be collected from his words and actions. * * But let it be supposed that a man without uttering a word should strike another on
the head with an axe, it must on every principle by which we
can judge of human actions, be deemed a premeditatedviolence :"
-?espublica v. Mulatto Bob, 4 Dall. 145. The statute has in no
degree altered the common-law definition of murder. But the killing
a human being by poison, or lying in wait, or by purposely using a
deadly weapon to that end, is murder in the first degree; and the
purpose and intent to kill must be determined by the circumstances
of the case; for the murderer takes with him no witnesses, and
does not often avow his purpose.
Where the requisite proof is adduced to show a.wicked, inten-
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tional murder, he is not permitted to show a voluntary and temporary intoxication in extenuation of his crime.
The respondent takes nothing by his exceptions.
Some confusion seems to exist as to
the proper effect of intoxication in criminal prosecutions. On the one hand, it
is often said to be an aggravation rather
than an excuse for crimes. Blackstone's
familiar language is, that as to "artificial, voluntarily contracted madness by
drunkenness or intoxication, which, depriving men of their reason, puts them
ina temporary phrensy ; our law looks
nponthis asan aggravation of the offence,
rather than as an excuse for any criminal misbehavior: 4 Bl. Com. p. 25.
Lord Coxx, also, used similar language:
4 Co. 125, a; 3 Thomas Coke 46.
But obviously this can not be true.
Simple larceny is only simple larceny,
however intoxicated the thief; a common assault and battery does not become an " aggravated assault," nor
manslaughter increase to murder, by the
fact that the perpetrator was under the
influence of intoxicating liquors, though
voluntarily taken. I is quite erroneots, therefore, to use such language to
a jury as it is very likely to mislead,
and may be sufficient to set aside a verdict. See Ferrellv. The State, 43 Tex.
507 (1875) ; Mclntyre v. The People,
.Aq ll. 514.
On the other hand, it is frequently
declared that drunkenness is never an
excuse for, or even an extenuation of a
crime. In one sense, that is undoubtedly true. If the crime has been in
fact committed, if a defendant has
deliberately and with malice aforethought committed a homicide, it is no
excuse or extenuation that he was at
the moment of its commission, deeply
intoxicated. He might have become so
simply to nerve himself for the act, or
his act might be wilful and malicious
although he was intoxicated; and his
condition would not even reduce the
crime to manslaughter or to murder

in the second degree : Commonwealth
v. Hawkins, 3 Gray 466 (1855).
If he has intentionally committed an
assault and battery, the fact that he was
intoxicated cannot of itself excuse or
extenuate his act. What would be murder in a sober man is not reduced to
manslaughter merely because the perpetrator was then intoxicated, even
though such condition was not produced
for the purpose of committing the crime.
Some countenance was given to such
a view in Smith v. The Commonwcalth, 1
Du. 220; and Bleinn v. The Conunonwealth, 7 Bush 820, but the error was
afterwards discovered and corrected by
the same court in Shannahan v. Tie
Commonwealth, 8 Bush 463 (1871).
And such is the well-established and
only safe rule of law ; People v. Rogers,
18 N. Y. 1 ; State v. Turner, Wright
80; State v. John, 8 bred. 330: Cornwall v. Tie State, Mart. & Yerg. 147;
Pirtle v. The State, 9 Humph. 663;
U. S. v. Clark, 2 Cranch C. C. 158;
U. S. v. MGlue, I Curtis C. C. 1;
Carterv. The State, 12 Tex. 500.
But between these two extremes there
is a broad middle ground, where the
fact of drunkenness may be entitled to
weight, not as an excuse for the crime,
nor even as an extenuation, but as tending to show that in fact no crime, or not
the particularcrime charged, was ever
committed.
Whenever the existence of some particular intent, motive or knowledge
must be actually and expressly proved
by the evidence, and is not necessarily
inferred from the fact itself, then the
question of ability to form such intent.
cherish such motive, or possess such
knowledge, is important; and if such
inability was owing to intoxication, it
should have the same effect as if due to
any other excuse, no more, no less
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Ferrell v. The State, 43 Tex. 508
(1875).
Thus, in a prosecution for passing
counterfeit money, the knowledge of the
character of the coin is an essential fact
to establish by evidence. The defendant
may therefore always show he was so
intoxicated at the time he could not discriminate between genuine and spurious
money ; this evidence might not be conclusire, for it might be shown in reply
that he had made or procured the money
for an unlawful purpose when sober,
but unless controlled by some other
evidence, the fact of such intoxication,
if fully established, might be a complete
defence: Pigman v. The State, 14 Ohio
555 (1846), where the reasons for such
a rule are well stated by READ, J. ;
bted States v. Roudenbush, I Bald. 518
(1832).
1n an indictment for larceny it might
be shown in evidence that the defendant
was too intoxicated to distinguish the
property taken from his own of a similar appearance, or that he was too confused and bewildered to form an intention of stealing, or to know he was doing so ; but this might not be conclusive, as he might have formed the design
before, when sober : see Venz v. The
State, 1 Tex. Ap. 36 (1876) : Bailey v.
The State, 26 Ind. 422 (1866; State v.
Schinqen, 20 Wise. 74 (1865) ; People
v. W-alker, 17 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 473
(1878).
So where a person is indicted for periury, in having falsely described a former transaction in pais, he may show in
defence that he was so grossly intoxicated at the time and place where the
transaction occurred that he could not
then correctly understand what was
done, and so in mis-stating it in court he
did not do so knowingly and corruptly :
Lytle v. The State, 17 Am. Law Reg.
N. S. 535.
So a person indicted for "knowingly" voting twice at the same electionunder a statute-may prove he was so
intoxicated the second time as to be un-

able to know he had voted before ; and
if so he could not be convicted : T7ne
People v. Harris, 29 Cal. 678 (1866).
It might be different if the statute
made it penal to vote, without regard to
the actual knowledge or intention of the
the voter, as seems to have been held in.
State v. Welsh, 21 Minn. 22 (1874).
On a charge of an assault "with intent to kill," in order to convict of the
whole offence, the specific intent must be
proved to exist ; it is not necessarily inferred from the merefact of the assault,
although the mode and manner of the
assault may be sufficient to prove it ; if,
therefore, the accused was really too
drunk to be capable of forming any intention whatever, and none such had
ever existed before, it would be a defence to that part of the charge, though
not to the minor offence of a common
assault: Regina v. Cruse, 8 C. & P.
541 ; Regina v. Mfonkhouse, 4 Cox C. C.
55 ; People v. Hammill, 2 Parker C. C.
223, 235 ; Mfooney v. The State, 33
Ala. 419; State v. Garrey, 11 Iinn.
154; Nichols v. The State, 8 Ohio St.
435.
So if a statute defining murder in the
first degree, requires it to be done "deliberately and premeditately," evidence
that the defendant was too much intoxicated to deliberate and to prembditate is
certainly competent, and if the jury
find the fact to be so, and there was no
evidence of prior premeditation, a jury
certainly would be warranted, if not required, in finding not guilty of that degree of murder. But the intoxication
is not an excuse or extenuation as a
matter of law, but only a circumstance
to be considered by the jury : Jones v.
The Commonwealth, 75 Penn. St. 403
(1874) ;.Pirtle v. The State, 9 Uumph.
663, a valuable case on this point ; State
v. Johnson, 40 Conn. 136 (1873) ; 41
Id. 577 ; People v. Williams, 43 Cal.
345 (1872) ; 21 Id. 544, 27 Id. 507
But see contra, The State v. Cross, 27
Mo. 33"2.
So in such cases evidence of intoxica.
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tion is competent upon the question
whether the killing sprang from premeditation or from sudden passion excited by inadequate provocation ; that
is, whether the intention to kill preceded
the provocation or was produced by
it : Haile v. The &ate, 11 Humph.
154; Swan v. The &ate, 4 Id. 136;
Jones v. T7e Sate, 29 Geo. 594; Rex v.
Thomas, 7 C. & P. 820.
But inadequate provocation for a sober man, insufficient to mitigate his act,
will not, in and of itsdf, have such effect in case of an intoxicated person.
There are not twq rules of sufficient provocation, one for sober men, and one for
drunken men : Keenan v. The Commonwealth, 44 Penn. St. 55, an excellent
case on this point. And see &ate v.
hicCanto, I Speers 384.
But the effect and weight of the fact
of intoxication, as tending to show the
absence or want of some specific intent
or of premeditation, is solely for the
jury. It is a matter to be considered
by them. The court, as a matter of
law, do not draw any conclusions from
it either way. The fact of intoxication
at the moment, is of course not conclusive of a want of intent or premeditation. The intent may have been
formed before, or it may exist, notwithstanding the intoxication, and concurrently with it. The defendant is not entitled to a charge or instruction that
intoxication will show a want of intent :

The State v. WMite, 14 Kans. 538 (1875) ;
Smith v. The State, 4 Nev. 278 (1876);
State v. Arery, 44 N. H. 398 (1862) ;
Kenny v. The People, 39 N. Y. 330;
O'lBrienv. The People, 48 Barb. 280.
But where the crime is made out from
implied malice, such as an unprovoked
assault and battery or murder, a malicious stabbing, or maliciously poisoning
a horse, the malicious intent being sufficiently proved by the act itself, the
fact of drunkenness has very little, if any
weight, as a defence: see Nichols v.
The State, 8 Ohio St. 435 (1858), a
case of malicious stabbing; The People
v. Porter,2 Parker C. C. 14, a case of
blasphemy; O'Herninv. The State, 14
Ind. 420; Dawson v. The state, 16 Id.
428 ; Hate v. Harlow, 21 Mo. 446, a
case of manslaughter; Choise v. The
State, 31 Geo. 424; State v. Mullen, 14
La. Ann. 570; The State v. Gut, 13
Minn. 343; Golden v. The State, 25
Geo. 527; &ate v. Johnson, 41 Conn.
577.
And that view seems to have led to
the decision in State v. Tatro, since the
learned judge speaks of the evidence of
the mode and manner of the crime as
showing "malice and malignity of purpose," although it is possible the lastsentence in the reported instruction to
the jury may not be entirely consistent
with some of the decisions stated above.
EDMUND H. BFNNETT.

Court of Errors and Apeals of New Jersey.
HURFF v. HIRES.
Where there is a sale of a specified quantity of goods from a mass, identical in
kind and uniform in value, a separation of the quantitv sold is not necessary to
pass the title, where the intention of the parties that the property should pass by
the contract of sale is clearly manfested; otherwise, where the articles composing
the mass are of different qualities and values, making a selection, and not merely
separation, necessary.
The defendant bought of one H. two hundred bushels of corn out of a lot of four
or five hundred bushels in H.'s crib-house. He inspected and approved of the corn
VOL. XXVIL-21
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as it laid in bulk, and paid the price in cash. The arrangement between the
defendant and H. was that the corn should be left in the crib until it was hardened,
and then H. was to deliver it. The whole lot of corn was then levied on by the
plaintiff as sheriff, under an execution against H. After the levy H. measured out
and delivered two hundred bushels of it to the defendant. In trover by the sheriff:
Beld, that a charge to the jury, that the two hundred bushels the defendant bought
not having been separated from the entire bulk, no property in it passed to the
purchaser, and that the whole was liable to levy under the execution against H., and
that the defendant was liable to the sheriff for the value of the two hundred bushels, was erroneous.

HUiRFr, the plaintiff in error, in the fall of 1873, purchased of
one Heritage two hundred bushels of corn, out of a lot of four or
five hundred bushels, which Heritage had in his crib-house.
He inspected and approved of the corn before he bought it, and
paid the cash for it immediately on the purchase. The arrangement between Hurff and Heritage was that the corn should be left
where it was until it should get hard enough to keep well in bulk,
and then Heritage was to deliver it. In January 18T4, Hires, as
sheriff of the county of Gloucester, by virtue of an execution
against Heritage, levied on the entire quantity of the corn as his
property. After the levy Heritage delivered two hundred bushels
of the corn to the defendant, whereupon the sheriff brought trover
against him. The defendant requested the court to instruct the
jury that if he and Heritage, at the time of the sale of the corn,
both meant and understood the sale to be complete, the property in
the corn passed to defendant, and the plaintiff could not recover its
value for his refusal to return it after it was separated and delivered
to him by Heritage.
This request was refused, and the court charged that notwithstanding Hurff bought and paid for two hundred bushels of Heritage's corn, before there was any levy upon it, yet as it appeared
it was in bulk with other corn, and not separated at the time of
the sale, no property in the corn passed to Hurff, but remained in
the defendant in execution, and was bound by the levy. And that,
therefore, the defendant was liable to the sheriff for the value of
the corn he received by the delivery of Heritage.
Error was assigned on the charge as given, and the refusal to
charge as requested. The case in the Supreme Court is reported in
17 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 11, with a note.

1). J. Pancoast,for plaintiff in error.
...

Slape, for defendant in error.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by.
DEPUE, J.-By the twentieth section of the act concerning executions, if any person shall purchase in good faith of a defendant
in execution, any goods or chattels, and pay for the same, prior to
the levy of the execution, and without notice thereof, the title of
such purchaser shall not be divested by the fact that such execution
had been delivered before such purchase was made: Revision 393.
This section was passed with a view to change the common-law rule
that goods and chattels were bound by an execution from the time
of its teste, and to qualify the provisions of the eighteenth section
of the same act, which gave an execution force against goods and
chattels only from the time of its delivery to the sheriff; but it'
clearly indicates the legislative policy of protecting the rights of
bona fide purchasers from executions against the vendor, where it
may be done consistently with the rules of law. Delivery of the
goods purchased is not essential to the protection of the purchaser's
rights.
A purcnase in good faith, without notice of the execution and
payment of the price, prior to actual levy, are the conditions under
which his title is good.
The corn was purchased by Hurff, and paid for in good faith before the execution was issued.
It was lying in the bulk unseparated when the levy was made;
and after levy, was separated from the mass, and delivered by the
vendor. The case was tried in the court below on the theory that,
though the purchaser bought the corn and paid the price, the title
did not pass to him because the quantity sold was not separated
from the original bulk until after levy, and that, therefore, the
whole still remained liable to seizure as the property of the vendor.
If the property had remained in bulk, the quantity purchased
never having been separated from the mass, the purchaser might
not have been able to maintain replevin, for the reason that in
replevin the plaintiff must be the owner of the specific chattels he
sues for, and must describe them in his writ: ,Scudderv. Warsler,
11 Cush. 573. But that does not solve the question involved in
this case. May not a party who has bought and paid for a specified
quantity or number of articles from a larger mass, identiczl in kind
and uniform in value, maintain trover against a third person who
converts the whole, or defend in trover"brought by an officer levying on the whole as the property of the vendor, when a separation
of the quantity he was entitled to under his purchase has been
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made after levy, and possession thereof has been delivered to
him'?
It is the general rule that the property in goods and chattels
passes under the contract of sale according to the intention of the
parties. The difficulty in the application of this rule is in determining under what circumstances the parties shall be considered
as having evinced an intention that property in the subject-matter
of sale should pass from the vendor to the purchaser. The cases
on this subject are quite numerous, and are not harmonious.
Those which have been decided on the peculiar language of the
Statute of Frauds have held a very stringent rule. Where the
right of an unpaid vendor to retain the goods is involved, courts have
laid hold of slight circumstances to retain in him the property until
the purchase-money be paid: Hansen v. Meyer, 6 East 614;
Wallace v. Breeds, 13 Id. 522; Shipley v. Davis, 5 Taunt. 617;
Rusk v. Davis, 2 M. & S. 397; Swanwick v. Southern, 9 A. & E.
901; Goalts v. Bose, 17 C. B. 229. Another class of cases are
those in which the contract is to supply goods of a particular
description, which would be fulifiled by furnishing any goods of
the quality and kind agreed to be furnished; Austin v. Craver, 4
Taunt. 644; Wait v. Baker, 2 Exch. 1. There is still another
class of cases where the sale is completed in all respects, except
that the bulk from which the property purchased is to be separated,
is not identical in kind or uniform in value, and some advantage
may be derived from the privilege of selection: Tooke v. Marsh,
51 N. Y. 288. The question whether the property has passed under
a contract of sale, has generally arisen where the right of an unpaid
vendor is in the issue. Payment of the price is so essential an
ingredient of a sale that neither in law nor in morals is the buyer
entitled to have the goods until he pays for them. The lien of the
vendor is waived where payment is to be made at a future day, or
there has been a delivery actual, and in some cases merely constructive; hence the inclination of the courts to hold on slight circumstances that the contract is so incomplete that a transfer of
title was not intended, where the delivery .is constructive only,
and the insolvency of the buyer has intervened with the contract
price unpaid. Prominent also among the cases in the same direction are those in which the right of the purchaser to object to the
quality of the article, which is the subject-matter of the contract
of sale, is involved. Here, also, there is an inclination to hold the
title to be in obeyance of any well-grounded objection to quality is
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apparent. A contract for the delivery of goods merely of a particular description is necessarily executory; and where it relates to
a certain quantity from a large bulk, not uniform in quality or
value, the transaction is so incomplete that until selection, and not
mere separation, is made, the rights of the parties respectively are
undefined. In cases like those mentioned, it is considered for substantial reasons that the title does not pass immediately upon the
terms of the contract being agreed on; not that these cases create
exceptions to the rule that the property will pass by the contract,
if such be the intention of the parties; but the circumstances are
such and of such weight that it is presumed that it was not the
intention of the parties that the sale should be complete.
The case under review is distinguished byanarked peculiarities from
those embraced in the foregoing classification. The contract of sale
was not obnoxious to the Statute of Frauds; the price was paid,
and consequently no right of a vendor to have the unpaid purchasemoney existed; nothing remained to be ascertained or adjusted to
determine what the rights of the parties were; the property had
been inspected and approved; it was left with the vendor for the
purchaser's convenience; and the mass from which quantity alone
was to be separated was identical in kind and uniform in value, so
that the privilege of selection would not confer any advantage upon
either party. Nothing was left undone by the parties except measuring out the quantity purchased from any part of the whole bulk
-a ministerial act, which might be done by either party, or by any
stranger, as well as by the parties themselves.
The tendency of the modern decisions is to give effect to contracts of sale according to the intention of the parties to a greater
extent than is found in the older cases, and to engraft upon the
rule, that the property passes by the contract of sale if such be the
intention, fewer exceptions, and those only which are founded on
substantial considerations affecting the interests of parties.
At one time it was held that under an agreement to purchase an
entire bulk, at a specified price, the property did not pass if the
whole-amount of the purchase-money depended upon an ascertainment by weight or measurement subsequently to be made: Hanson
v. Meyer, 6 East 614. This decision was made in favor of an unpaid vendor, and was afterwards distinguished on the ground that
the weighing was to be done by the seller, and it was held that the
property would pass if such was the intention of parties, though
something was to be done, such as weighing, measuring or testing
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the goods, to ascertain the contract price, if what remained to be
done was to be done by the buyer: Turley v. Bates, 2 H. & C.
200. This distinction was adopted in Boswell v. Green, 1 Dutcher
391. Still later the English courts entirely repudiated this distinction, and held, in cases where the weighing was to be done by
the seller, the property would pass, though the ultimate contract
price was to be ascertained by a subsequent weighing, if the partiee
so-intended; and. COCKBURx, C. J., in his opinion, said that "it
is equally clear, that in point of principle, and in point of common
sense, there is nothing to prevent a man from passing the property
to the thing he proposes to sell, and the buyer proposes to buy,
although the price may remain to be ascertained afterwards:" fartineau v. Kitehing, L. R. 7 Q. B. 436; Castle v. Playford, L. R.
7 Exch. 98. It may now be considered as the law of the English
courts that where the contract price has been paid or advances
made on it the property will pass to the buyer, according to the intention of the parties, although something remains to be done by
the seller to complete the goods in conformity with the contract, before they are ready to be delivered: Young v. Matthews, L. R. 2
C. P. 127 ; Langton v. Waring, 18 0. B. Nq. S. 315.
That the parties contemplated the corn should be measured before it left the vendor's possession will not of itself prevent the property passing. Nor will the fact that the vendor was required to
deliver it when the time for delivery arrived, accomplish that result.
Where the goods sold have been selected and designated, and the
price paid, the property will pass by the contract of sale, though it
was one of the terms of the contract that the vendor should transport them to a place named for delivery: Terry v. Wheeler, 25
N. Y. 520. The case, therefore, must stand exclusively on the
fact that no separation of the quantity sold had been made from
the entire bulk before the execution was levied; and the question
is whether there is a rule of law requiring, under the circumstances
of this case, a separation of the quantity sold from the larger bulk
before title will pass to the purchaser, so positive in its sanction as
to overrule the intention of the parties.
It is undoubtedly the doctrine of the English courts that where
there is a bargain for a certain quantity ex a greater quantity, and
there is a power of selection in the vendor to deliver which he
thinks fit, there the right to them does not pass to the vendee until
the vendor has made his selection: per BALE.Y, J., Gillett v. Hill,
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2 C. & I. 530. This doctrine is founded on correct principles
where the gross bulk is variable in kind or quality, and the selection from it of that part which shall be delivered is of benefit to
the vendor. It has been applied to a sale of a specified. quantity
from a larger bulk of uniform kind and value, where the purchaser
had seen the goods in bulk and approved of it: Aldridge v. Johnson, 7 E. & B. 885.
In my judgment this principle should not be applied where the
bulk from which the quantity purchased is to be separated is uniform in kind and quality, and has been approved by the purchaser;
and the full contract price has been paid.
There is a dear and well-settled legal distinction between the
individual rights of several parties in goods of uniform kind and
quality, and in those in which there is no uniformity in these
respects. It is recognised in cases of a co-tenancy of personal
property readily divisible by weight or measurement into portions
absolutely alike in quality and value. In such cases either tenant
may take his proper proportion, and it will be regarded as a proper
severance so long as he does not take more than his share; but the
rule is otherwise in case of property not severable in this manner;
in that event the partition must be by agreement, or proceedings in
equity: Tripp v. Riley, 15 Barb. 333; Channon v. Lusk, 2 Lansing 211; Clark v. Griffith, 24 N. Y. 595 ; Freeman on Co-tenancy,
§ 252; 6 Am. Law. Rev. 458. It is also recognised in cases of the
intermingling of the goods of several owners where the whole is
undistinguishable in quality and value. In Jackson v. Anderson,
4 Taunt. 24, one F. at Buenos Ayres consigned, to L. & Co. a.
barrel containing 4718 Spanish dollars, and advised the plaintiff
that 1969 of them were designed for him as a remittance of thenet proceeds of sales made by him on plaintiffs account.
L. & Co. assigned the bill of lading to the defendants, who received the whole value of the $4718, and carried it to the credit
of L. & Co.
In an action of trover the plaintiff was allowed.
to recover. No separation was ever made of the $1969 which
the plaintiff should have received, and consequently there was,
no individualization of the specific dollars he was entitled to. It
was contended by the defendants that no separation having been
made of the $1969 to enable the piaintiff to designate them as his,
property, trover was not maintainable. The objection was overruled, and MANSFIELD, C. J., said, "It appears that no separation
was ever made from the whole quantity of $1969 belonging to the
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plaintiff, and an objection has been taken on that ground against
the form of action; but we think there is no difficulty on that
point; the defendant has disposed of all the dollars; consequently,
he has disposed of those which belonged to the plaintiff; and as
all are of' the same value it cannot be a question what particular
dollars were his; * " * one has a right to a certain number, and
the other to the rest; if a man keeps all, and has no right to a
part, the action lies for that part which he wrongfully detains."
In Gardner v. Dutch, 9 Mass. 427, the plaintiff, in the adjustment of the accounts of a voyage performed for W. & R. in the
schooner Liberty, became entitled to 76 bags of coffee lying in a
lot of bags, and not distinguished by marks, or in any manner
separated from the others. As against an officer levying on the
whole by virtue of an attachment against W. & R., the plaintiff
was allowed to miintain replevin for his part, the court saying,
"though the bags belonging to him had no distinguishing mark~s,
he might have taken the number of bags, and the quantity of
coffee, to which he was entitled by his own selection, while they
remained in the hands of W. & R., and the defendant as a deputy
sheriff could not change the rights of third parties."
There are authorities of great weight that apply this doctrine to
contracts of'sale.. In Whitehiouse v. Frost,12 East 614, the defendants, Dutton and Bancroft, were the owners of forty tons of oil
in the oil-house at Liverpool, of which they held the key. They
sold ten of the forty tons to Frost, who in turn sold the same to
Townshend, who afterwards became bankrupt, and the plaintiffs were
his assignees. The oil, at the time of the purchase by Townshend,
and when he became bankrupt, was lying in the cistern, mixed with
the other oil. The plaintiffs were nevertheless held entitled to maintain trover, though the oil had never been separated from the quantity in the cistern. In Woodley v. Coventry, 2 H. & C. 164, one
Clarke had purchased of defendants, who were corn factors, 350 barrels of flour of specifid brands, and received from them a delivery order. Clarke sold 348 barrels to the plaintiffs, and gave them a delivery order, which was accepted by the defendants. The defendants
having afterwards refused to make delivery, the plaintiffs brought
trover. The defendants had in their warehcse a much larger
quantity of flour of the specified brands, and there had been no
separation or appropriation of any particular barrels to Clarke. It
was objected on behalf of the defendants, that as there had been
no appropriation of any specific barrels of flour, no property
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passed from the defendants to Clarke, and, therefore, he coild convey no property to the plaintiffs. The objection was overruled,
and the plaintiffs had a verdict. In Gillett v. Hill,2 C. & M. 530,
the defendant, a wharfinger, accepted an order made by one of
their customers, in favor of the plaintiffs, for twenty sacks of flour.
In trover it was contended that no specific sacks having been
selected and appropriated by the defendants, no property vested in
the vendee, and trover was not maintainable. The court held the
action was well brought. In Knght v. Wiffin, Law Rep.. 5 Q.B. 660,
the defendant having a quantity of barley in sacks lying in his granary, sold eighty quarters to M. No particular sacks were appropriated to M., but the barley remained at the granary, subject to his
orders. M. sold sixty quarters to the plaintiff, who paid for them,
and received a delivery order, which was presented and accepted
by the defendant. On refusal by the defendant to deliver the sixty
quarters, the plaintiff was allowed to recover their value in trover.
In Farmaloe v. Bain, 1 C. P. Div. 445, the defendants sold
B. & Co. one hundred tons of zinc, to be taken from a quantity
defendants had on their wharf. The plaintiffs bought of B. & Co.
and paid for fifty tons of the zinc. No separation was made of
either the one hundred tons originally purchased by B. & Co., or
of the fifty tons bought by the plaintiffs. The action was in trover
and detinue for fifty tons of zinc, and no point was made by counsel
or court that a separation of the goods sued for had not been made
from the gross bulk. The case resulted in favor of the defendants
on the ground that they were unpaid vendors, and that they did not
intend to part with their property without payment for it.
These cases cited, it is true, were against defendants who were
treated as mere custodians of the property, and the right to maintain the action was put on the ground of estoppel. The English
courts make a distinction between this class of cases and actions
directly between the vendor and purchaser. But manifestly this
distinction is in semblance only, and not in substance.
In each of the cases above cited, except Gillett v. Hill, the defendant was the original vendor, and no separation of the goods
had been made as between him and his vendee, and the acceptance
of a delivery order created no other contract than that in force
between him and his vendee to hold for the benefit of the subvendee a certain designated quantity of goods. Acceptance of the
delivery order might estop a defendant from denying that he had
VOL. X=VI.-22
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that quantity of goods in his custody, subject to the order of the
person signing the delivery order. But if there be a rule of law
which overrules the intentions of parties, and forbids property passing under a contract of sale, unless the quantity sold be separated
from the larger mass, it is difficult to perceive why it should not
produce the same result between the original vendor and the holder
of a delivery order, who in virtue thereof succeeds only to the
rights of the original vendee, as it would between the parties to
the original contract of sale.
Nor will the fact that a defendant stands in the position of bing
regarded as a mere custodian of the property, materially alter the
situation of the parties; for it is well settled that a vendor may
become the bailee of his vendee, and the custodian, for his benefit,
of the property sold, if the parties so intend: M'/arvin v. Wallis,
6 E. & 13. 726; Beaumont v. Brengeri, 5 0. B. 301; Castle v.
Swarder, 6 H. & N. 828.
While the English courts adhere to the rule that, as between
vendor and purchaser, separation of the quantity sold from a larger
bulk, identical in kind and quality, is necessary, before the title
will pass, how slight and unimportant a circumstance will take the
transaction out of the operation of the rule, is shown by Aldridge
v. Johnson, supra.
There the plaintiff bought of one K. one hundred out of two
hundred quarters of barley, which plaintiff had seen in bulk and
approved, and he paid part of the price. It was agreed that the
plaintiff should send sacks for the barley, and that K. should fill the
sacks, and take them to a railway station to be forwarded to the plaintiff. The plaintiff sent sacks only for part of the barley; K. filled
these, but did not deliver them; and in a few days he turned the
barley out of the sacks, on the heap from which it was taken, so
as to be undistinguishable from the rest of the heap, and became
bankrupt. The plaintiff tendered to the assignee in bankruptcy
the balance of the purchase-money, and demanded the two hundred quarters of barley, and, on a refusal to deliver them, sued
him in trover. It was held that he was entitled to recover for the
portion put in the sacks by K., but for the residue he was without
remedy. It did not appear in the case that the plaintiff, in fact,
knew that a portion of the barley had been put in the sacks, and
therefore he could not actually have assented to the selection that
was made; and the assent of the vendee to the specific appropri-
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ation was regarded, in Campbell v. tersey Docks, 14 0. B. N. S.
412, as necessary, when such an appropriation is needed to transfer the title. Furthermore, when the demand was made on the
assignee in bankruptcy, which laid the foundation for the action,
the barley lay in the heap, and the part K. had put in the sacks
was not distinguishable from the rest. If, therefore, the defendant
had complied with the demand so far as the court held that he
should have complied, he could only have done so by separating
from the heap as much in quantity as the bankrupt had measured
up-a process he could have as readily performed in relation t9 the
full quantity of the barley covered by the contract. A comparison
of the facts in evidence with the result that was reached, will
show that the rights of the parties were disposed of upon a mere
formality.
In the American courts, the cases on this subject are quite conflicting. Many of them are cited and examined by Mr. Holmes,
in his notes to 2 Kent (12th ed.) 492, 590, and more particularly
in his article in 6 Am. Law Rev. 450.
In Virginia, New York, Connecticut and Maine, the courts have
held the broad doctrine, without qualification, that on a contract of
sale of a certain quantity, from a larger bulk, uniform in kind and
quality, the property will pass, ihough there be no separation of
the quantity sold, if such be the intention of parties, and that no
rule of law will overrule such intention, if it be otherwise clearly
expressed: Pheasant&v. Pendleton, 6 Rand. 473; Kimberly v.
Patchin,19 N. Y. 330; Bussel v. Carrington, 42 N. Y. 118;
Chapman v. Shephard, 39 Conn. 413; Waldron v. Chase, 37
Maine 414.
Kimberly v. Patchin is a leading case. It was there held, that
upon a sale of a specified quantity of grain, the separation from a
mass, indistinguishable in quality or value, in which it was included,
was not necessary to pass the title, when the intention to do so
was clearly manifested. But it is otherwise when the articles
composing the mass are of different qualities and values, making
not merely separation, but selection necessary: Chapman v.
Shephard.
In Waidron v. Chase it was decided that where the owner of a
large quantity of corn in bulk, sold a certain number of bushels,
and received his pay, and the vendee took part away with him, the
property in all the corn vested in the vendee, although it was not
measured or separated from the heap.
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This case was not overruled by Morrison v. .Dwigley, 63 Maine
533, but was distinguished on the ground that in the latter case
the vendor had not received his pay, and it was not to be presumed
that he intended to part with his title without payment of the contract price.
The doctrine held in these cases, it seems to me, is founded on
good sense and correct legal principles. The rule that the property in goods will pass by the contract of sale, if such be the intention of the parties, is of the utmost importance in the transaction.of the business of the country, and it ought not to be qualified
by exceptions and restrictions which do not arise from the substantial interests of the parties.
In this case the sale in all material respects was complete.
The corn had been inspected and approved, and the price agreed
on and paid. All these things had been done before the levy of
the execution. The property had been left with the vendor for
the purchaser's convenience.
Nothing was left undone but measuring out the designated quantity
from a bulk identical in kind and value, and a delivery to the
vendee. That was done after the levy, and before suit brought;
and there is no pretence that it was unfairly done.
The defendant by his purchase and the payment of the price,
acquired equitable rights that ought, if possible, to be protected;
and it is the policy of the law to protect interests acquired for a
valuable consideration in good faith against the claims of execution
creditors. In trover property is involved only so far as determines
the form of the action and the damages recoverable. The defence
was a meritorious one, and no legal principle is in the way of permitting it to be made, if in fact the parties intended that the property should pass.
That question should have been submitted to the jury, and for
that reason the judgment should be reversed.
The question raised by the principal
case is so squarely met by the New Jersey Court of Errors, in the learned opinion above given, that, for the present,
it must cease to be regarded as a question in that state. Whether other courts
shall, in their wisdom, affirm it or dissent from it, they will not fail to notice
it; and thus, in any view, it is likely to

be an important decision upon a most
important question under the contract
of sale.
The question, reduced to its simplest
form, is this : When a specified quantity,
ex a bulk of uniform kind and value,
is sold; and paid for and left by the purchaser, undistinguished from the bulk in
the seller's possession, who afterwards
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separates the part sold from the bulk,
does the title to the part pass to the
buyer at the time of the sale and payment, or at the time of its separation
from the bulk?
The principal case decides that, under circumstances such as these, separation of the specified quantity sold is
not necessary to pass title, which passes
at the time of sale and payment, and
while the part is undistinguished from
the bulk, if such were the intention of
the parties. The opiniox of the court,
delivered by Dzrrr, J., is an able defence of this conclusion.
The line of reasoning pursued by the
Court of Errors, in arriving at this conelusion, is briefly this : It is a principle
of law that, in sales of chattels, title
passes according to the intention of the
parties to the contract of sale. 'Intention is a matter for the jury to infer from
the facts of each case. Facts going to
show intention should be left to the jury,
unless some rule of law warrants withholding them. Where the subject of sale
is part of a uniform bulk, from which it
is in nowise distinguished, title to the
part sold would, under the principles
just stated, pass according to the intention of the parties; and facts going to
show intention should be submitted to
the jury, unless there be a rule of law
applying to this class of cases to take
them out of the operation of this principle. There is a rule of law, that where
a part is sold out of a bulk, separation
or some appropriation of the part to the
contract is necessary, before title to the
part passes to the buyer. It is the opinion of this court, however, that this rule
should apply where selection is of benefit
to the buyer or seller; but where the
bulk is uniform, it is the'judgment of
this court that this rule of law, which
requires severance, should not and does
not apply. Hence, in the present case,
this rule not applying, there is nothing
in the way to prevent the passage of
title in the part sold before it is distin-

guished from the hulk, if the parties to
the sale so intended. The inspection
and approval of the bulk and the payment of the price, in this case, are circumstances from which a jury might
have inferred an intention to pass title
before separation of the part from the
bulk, which by agreement was postponed. If the jury found such intention, there is no rule of law to prevent
title passing to the purchaser while the
subject of sale is undistinguished from
the bulk in the possession of the seller,
and a levy made on the bulk would not
bind the part so sold. Hence, as there
were facts in this case from which a
jury might have inferred an intention
to pass title, and as there is no legal rule
in the way of permitting it which the
intention of the parties would not override, the courts below erred in holding
that the facts going to prove intention
should not be submitted to the jury.
The Supreme Court had, upon the
same state of the case, and with the
same legal propositions before it, reached
an exactly opposite conclusion. The
opinion of this latter court was delivered
by SoU DDER, J., and reported in full in
this journal for January 1878.
The line of reasoning pursued by
the Supreme Court was this : It is a
principle of law that in sales of chattels
title passes according to the intention
of the parties. The facts from which
such intention may be inferred should
in all cases be given to the jury, unless
there be a rule of law, which, upon the
admitted facts, applies to a given case,
to'take it out of the operation of this
principle of interest. In sales of a
part out of a bulk, there is such a rule
of law. The rule is, that where there
is a sale of a specified quantity ex a
bulk, title to the part sold does not pass
to the buyer until some appropriation
of the part to the contract has been
made. This rule is, in its nature and
operation, superior to and irrespective
of the intention of the parties. From
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admitted facts, this case comes within
this rule : hence, as the intention of the
parties could in no wise affect the operation of this rule, the court below did
not err in withholding from the jury,
facts as to intention.
From a comparison of these two
opinions, as well as from the cases
cited, it is apparent that the question
turns upon the nature of this rule of
law, of which such diverse views are
held. This rule, which we shall for
brevity's sake, call the Rule of Ascertainment, may be broadly stated to
be, that in sales of a part ex a bulk,
title does not pass until the part has
been ascertained, i. e. reduced to certainty.
The opinions agree, that the whole
difficulty, in the principal case, arises
from the collision, which occurs between
the operation of this rule and the application of the principle, that title passes
according to the intention of the parties, which we may call the principle
of intent.
The diametrically opposite conclusions reached by the two
courts, result from the opposite views
held of the nature of this rule of ascertainment.
The Supreme Court regard this rule
as an outgrowth and expression of
those fundamental laws upon which the
contract of sale is based. Hence, to be
in its nature superior to and in its operation irrespective of the intention of the
parties. The Court of Errors, on the
other hand, regard it as a mere artificial rule of law, which a progressive
court should lay aside when commercial convenience or substantial justice
may, in the opinion of the rourt, require it. The question then, is practically reduced to this inquiry, viz.,
what is the nature of this rule of
ascertainment ?
In considering this question, it will
be necessary to recur for a moment to
the fundamental principles of the executed contract of sale, the essential prin-

ciples of which are contained in Blackstone's definition, that I Isale is a transferring of goods for money," and its
most primitive illustration would be a
seller with an article in his hand, and a
buyer with the price in his, simultaneously exchanging the one for the
other, in which ideal sale property and
possession never part company, and delivery is contemporaneous with the execution of the contract. However unsuited this to commercial convenience,
it is the true form of the executed contract of sale. Nor are the essential features of this normal sale ever departed
from, in contemplation of law. One
of these essential features is the execution of the sale by handing the article
to the buyer. From the significance of
this act the doctrine of delivery arises,
and to it we may trace the rule of law
now under consideration.
In this normal sale, the seller hands
the article to the buyer. Thus it will
be noticed, the subject of sale is ascertained before Iroperty passed ; for the
handing is per se an ascertainment or
reduction to certainty. If he hold out
two articles, and either he or the buyer
select one, the subject of sale would thus
have been ascertained before property
passed. It is equally evident that no
specific title to either article could pass
until there had been a selection, or at
least a unanimity as to what article it
was that constituted the subject of sale.
Not only because mutual intention, without unanimity, is a flat contradiction,
but also, because delivery is that which
executes the sale ; and this selection,
mental though it be, is a necessary preliminary to any method of delivery.
For delivery is a twofold conception,
it is a selecti6n and a physical transfer
of the thing selected. And any means
by which this selection or unanimity
could be either attained or communicated, whether by word, look, act or even
thought of the mind directed to a specific article would amount to a selection
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or appropriation of that article, upon
which the physical transfer could operate. It is an aphorism that ire can do
no determinate act without its appropriate antecedent mental condition. Hence,
by a lawv fundamental in the nature of
thingi, selection must precede the delivery of the thing selected, and that is all
the rule of ascertainment requires ; a
rule not altered, that we can see, by the
fact that the selection is to be made from
a bulk uniform in kind and value. It
is evident then that a sale in order to
be executed by delivery must have, as
an essential feature, this selection of the
thing to be delivered; must, in other
words, conform to the rule under consideration, because this rule is in its nature and reason based on fundamental
laws as unvarying in their application
as the law of gravitation.
But it may be said, that while the rule
thus applies in cases where title passes
by actual delivery, to necessitate this ascertainment of the exact subject of sale,
that "1constructive delivery" is a legal
substitute for this, and does not require
the same degree of certainty. A substitute of whatI Constructive delivery is
the substitution of a symbolical act for
the physical act of transfer of possession
under the contract of sale, and as a substitute it must take the place of its principal, viz. : of thephysical transfer of possession. -But the delivery which passes
title consists, as we have seen, of a selection and a physical transfer of the
thing selected. If now we put the symbelic act in the place of the physical act,
we shall have a selection and a symbolic act. The substitution in nowise
waives the selection, which is preliminary and independent of the method of
transfer. Transfer of title by constructive delivery then in no view obviates the
necessity of the selection upon which
the transfer is predicated, which is, in
the nature of things, just as essential a
preliminary in the one case as in the
otner. The legal permission extending

no further than the substitution of a
method of manifesting, by symbolic act,
a unanimity or selection previously
reached. This selection is not the result of either the physical or of the symbolic act, but is attained by that select-.
ive process which enters of necessity
into any method of delivery, actual or
constructive, real or symbolic, to all
modes of executing the contract of sale
-to every method by which, in contemplation of law, title passes.
The conclusion, then, to which these
elementary considerations would seem
to point, is, that the view of this rule
held by the courts below was not without a certain foundation in law and
reason, namely, that the nature of this
rule is such, that no sale can be executed, so as to pass title to the subject
of sale, unless there be either a phys-1ical transfer of the subject of sale, or
a legal substitute to the same intent,
either of which methods is equally and
iecessarily predicated upon, a selection
or unanimity as to the subject of sale,
which is all that the rule, in its essential nature, requires.
If, now, the subject of sale be "a specified quantity, ex a bulk, uniform in
kind and value," that circumstance can
have no influence upon the operation
of a law of this nature, of a law which
has no reference to kind, or value, or
to any attribute of the subject of sale,
but regards solely the fundamental doctrine that the selection, upon which the
passage of title is based, must, by a law
of mind, necessarily precede the passage
of title. If such be the nature of this
rule, the position of the Supreme Court
below, that the intentions of the parties
could not prevail against it, is evidently
a logical sequetce, the transfer of title
being a matter of law, not a matter of
contract. Contracts can only form personal obligations between the contracting parties.. Lawexecutes all contracts.
The contract cannot, of itself, produce
this -effect ; still less is it the part of any
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contract to dictate what, for its purposes, shall be a transfer of title, in opposition to legal rules, or in disregard
of legal requirements.
,Toargue that, becauseintention makes
the contract, therefore it makes the executed contract, is clearly sophisticalis adding a value to one side only of
an equation. Add to both sides, and no
one can dispute the result, viz., that
intention plus legal manifestation makes
an executed contract; but in this legal
manifestation, which executes the contract, is involved, as we have seen, the
idea of the selection or ascertainment
of the subject of sale; for how can
parties legally manifest a mutual intention, which admittedly lacks unanimity on so vital a point as the very
subject-matter of the contract?
Having now considered the nature
and operation of this rule as held by the
court below, we shall cite those anthotitles decided under it and which will
be found to support the view taken.
The rule, it will be borne in mind, is
that where a specified quantity of goods
out of a bulk is sold, the sale is incomplete and title does not pass until the
part sold is identified or appropriated to
the contract.
The rule is substantially agreed upon
by civilians and common lawyers: Picot's Com. des Inst. Livrol][L,tit. 23, see.
3; Digest 18, 1 ; Pothier Trait du contrat de vente, p. 4, n. 308; Code Napoleon, No. 1585 ; 2 Kent's Com. 496 ;
Hilliard on Sales 135, sect. 1-5; Benjamin on Sales 304, s. 352, e seq.;
Story on Sales 328, sect. 296, et seq.;
Blackburn on Sales 20; 1 Parsons on
Contracts 440, et seq.
Luke xiv., 19, "I have bought five
yoke of oxen and I go to prove them."
(the word translated "prove" ?),
&aioniaaL
means an approval or acceptance based
on examination. A curious instance
showing at once the prevalence of the
rule and the importance attached to it,
for the excuse is practically, "I have

bought the oxen but until I select them
I get no title to them."
It is customary to divide the cases into
1,those which support the rule, and 2,
those which are antagonistic to it; and
these two classes are generally regarded
as being directly conflicting. If, however, the nature and operation of the
rule be as we have considered it, these
two classes of decisions may be reconciled without violence to any essential
requirement of the law, and the cases
spoken of as conflicting by the court of
error be reduced to something very like
harmony.
The first class is composed of those
cases which hold the straight doctrine
that under the rule title to the part does
not pass until the part has been reduced
to certainty. This class should be subdivided into those in which this point is
ruled without any foreign or incidental
circumstances ; and those in which such
elements are introduced. The former
speak no uncertain sound and need only
to be cited, such are*: Repel.e v. Macie,
(1824) 6 Cowen 250 ; Downer v. Thompson (1841), 2 Hill 137 ; Whitev. Wilks,
(1813) 5 Taunt. 176; Austin v. Craven,
4 Id.644 ; Scudder v. Worster, 11 Cash.
575; Aldridge v. Johnston, (1857) 7 E.
& B. 885 ; Langton v. Higgins, 4
HurlSt. & N. 402 ; Keder v. Goodvin,
(1873) 111 Mass. 490; Haldeman v.
Duncan, (1865) 1 P. F. Smith 6;
Morrion v. Dingley, (1874) 63 Me.
553; Hutchinson v. Biunter (1847), 7
Barr 140 ; Golder v. Ogden, 15 Penna.
St. (3 Harris) 528 ; Waldo v. Beecher,
11 Ired. 609 ; Merrill v. Hunnewell, 13
Pick. 213 ; Hires v. Hurff, 39 N. J. 4.
The other division of those cases which
support the rule comprises those in which
the determination of price, kind or quality is incidental to'the main point of the
case. As the determination of these
incidents is often a condition precedent
to the execution of ordinary sales, it
has been contended that these cases were
not controlled strictly by the rule,
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but by principles drawn from and
equally applicable to sales of the
entirety. An examination of the cases
themselves, however, will not fail to
show that in them the real question was
not whether title passed before the
price, &c., were determined, but whether
it passed at all; the ascertainment of
the part being not as a mere basis for
the determination of the price, &c., but
for the essential object of reaching that
unanimity as to the subject of sale required by the rule. Such cases are:
Simmons v. Swtjf, B. & C. 857 (1826) ;
Hanson v. Meyer, 6 East 614 (1805) ;
Zauryv. Furnell,2 Camp. 240 (1810);
Ward v. Slew, 7 Wend. 404 (1831)
Fitch v. Lozee, 15 Id. 221 (1836)
Wrood v. McGee, 7 Ohio 467 (1836)
Rugg v. Minett, 11 East 209 (1809);
Wallace v. Breeds, 13 Id. 522 ; Gillett
T. Hill, 2 C. & M. 530; Foot v. Marsh,
51 N. Y. 288 (1873) ; Bush v. Davis, 2
M. & Selw. 398 (1814) ; Shipley v. Davis, 5 Taunt. 617 (1814) ; Thompson v.
Conover, 31 N. J. 466 (1865); Logan
v. Le Mesurier, 6 Moore Priv. C. Cases
116.
We may take this last case as a type
of this class. Logan v. Le Mesurier
was a case in which the buyer bought
and paid for a raft of lumber, measuring "fifty thousand feet, more or less,"
with an agreement that, should it turn
out more, the excess was to be paid for
at 91d. per foot. The raft was shipped,
and totally destroyed. The question
was, had title passed? The Court of
Queen's Bench, at Montreal, decided
that it had ; but the Court of Appeals
for Lower Canada reversed this judgment, and decided that title had not
passed. The seller appealed to her Majesty in Council, where the decision of
the Court of Appeals was affirmed by
Lord BnourPA , after an exhaustive
review of principles and authorities.
The second class is composed of those
cases in which title was considered to
have passed to the buyer before actual
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separation of the part from the bulk.
These are the cases spoken of as antagonistic to the rule of ascertainment,
and relied upon by the court in the
principal case. If, however, the view
held by the court below, of the nature.
and effect of that rule, were founded on
correct reasoning and on sound principles, these cases are not antagonistic
to the rule, as claimed, but are instances
in which the courts have, in the application of a rule of law, availed themselves of circumstances, clearly within
limits compatible with the nature of the
rule, to mitigate its seeming strictness.
We have seen that the nature of this
rule is such, that all that it demands,
as an essential, is that a selection, or
unanimity as to the subject of sale, shall
have been reached, between the parties,
upon which transfer of possession, actual or symbolic, could be predicated.
In this view, the cases in question are
clearly within the rule. In every case
there was present a manifestation of
just what the rule requires, viz., some
act which indicates that a unanimity, as
to the subject of sale, has been reached,
upon which transfer could be based.
Take the oft-cited case of hieouse
v. Frost, which is a typical case. This
was a sale of ten tons of oil, out of a
bulk of forty tons, in the possession of
a third party. The seller gave to the
buyer a delivery order on the custodian
for the ten tons, which was accepted.
The court held that title to the ten tons
passed to the buyer with the order and
acceptance. But how is this antagonistic to the rule, as we understand it ?
The parties had arrived at a complete
unanimity as to the subject of sale, and
clearly manifested it. The selective process, so far as either party was concerned, was as complete as it ever could
be, and the subject of sale had been reduced to a legal certainty, upon which
transfer could be predicated, without the
exercise, de novo, of the selective process, by either party. And this is the
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test. It is this feature which, running
through this class of caes, harmonizes
them with the rule, and distinguishes
them from the principal case. These
cases are: Whztehouse v. Frost, 12 East
614 (1810) ; Kimberly v. .Patchin,19 N.
Y. 330 (1859); Cushing v. Breed, 14
Allen 376 (1867) ; Woolbury v. Coventry, 2 H. & C. 164; Knights v. Wiffin,
Law Rep. 5 Q. B. 660. It is customary
to include, among these cases, several
which have been repeatedly discriminated
as having been decided upon entirely different questions.

Enough has been said to show that,
in this view of the case, themselves,
and in view of the further fact that they
are immensely outnumbered and our
weighted, they offer no obstacle to the
operation of au established rule of law,
even if such rule were, as the court consider it, an artificial rule of custom and
convenience ; while, if we adopt those
views of the nature of that rule which
seem to have been entertained by the
court below, the rule will be found to
harmonize all the cases-except Hires v.
Hurf.
C. G. G.
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A tender after default does not discharge the lien of a mortgage, although sufficient in amount. Where a tender is made after the day it should be kept good.
A. executed a deed of trust in the nature of a mortgage to secure the payment
of a promissory note for $2000, made the same day, and payable one year from
date, upon the order of B., more than a year afterwards.
A. tendered B. $2000 in "greenbacks" and $40 in gold,. which was the full
amount then due. The tender was refused and not thereafter kept g6od. Held,
that the tender should have been kept good in order to discharge the mortgage.

ON the 10th of December 1855, one Martin, complainant's intestate, being indebted to McGoon, as evidenced by his promissory
note of that date, payable one year after date, for $2000, money
loaned, with interest at the rate of ten per cent. per annum, executed his deed of trust, in the nature of. a mortgage on certain real
estate, to secure the payment thereof. Some payments of interest
having been made, but the principal of the note, and a part of the
interest remaining unpaid, on or about the 1st of March 1863,
Martin tendered to McGoon, as the amount then due on the note,
$2000 in legal tender and $40 in gold, which McCoon declined
to accept.
Early in the year 1866 the trustee in the deed of trust, at -the
request of McGoon, advertised the property for sale, for the purpose
of satisfying the amount claimed to be due on the note.
Thereupon, on the 27th of February 1866, appellants filed their
bill to enjoin this sale, and for an account, &c. Answers were
filed and replications thereto, and the court referred it to a jury to
find:

CRAIN v. McGOON.

1st. What was the amount due on the note March 1st 1863 ?
2d. Whether Martin made a tender at that time?
3d. Whether, if made, it was kept good?
The jury found: 1st. Amount due on the note March lst 1863,
$2040. 2d. Tender made March 1st 1863, $2040. 3d. Tender
not kept good. Subsequent to this finding by the jury, McGoon
filed his cross-bill, praying a decree of foreclosure of the deed
of trust, and a sale of the property to satisfy the amount due.
Answer was filed to the cross-bill, setting up in substance the same
facts relied upon in the bill as ground for relief. The court, on
final hearing, dissolved the injunction and found there was due
McGoon on the note $1311.25, for which foreclosure was decreed.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SCHOLFIELD, C. J.-The principal grounds relied upon by appellants for reversing the decree are: 1st. That the tender made on the
lst of March 1863, discharged the mortgage, although the tendermay
not have been kept good. 2d. That the tender was kept good, and
there should, therefore, have been no decree of foreclosure. Kortright
v. Cady, 21 N. Y. 343; Cfaruthers v. ffumphreys, 12 Mich. 270,
and Vanhusen v. Kanouse, 13 Id., cited by appellant's counsel,
sustain them in their first position. It is, however, conceded in
those cases that the common law doctrine .was different, and that it
required a tender at the time the debt is due, technically termed the
"law day," to discharge the mortgage, or an actual payment of the
amount. The doctrine of the common law was that default in payment
at the time and place stipulated, forfeited absolutely the estate of the
mortgagor ; the land was therefore taken away from him for ever:
Coke Littleton 205 a. If, however, the mortgagor made a tender of the debt due at the stipulated time and place, and the mortgagee refused to receive it, the mortgage was discharged: Coke
Littleton 207 a. But a convenient time before sunset on the day
of payment, was the last time given to make the tender: Coke
Littleton 206 b.
Courts of equity acting upon their general .principles, in order
to prevent injustice to the mortgagor, resulting from the commonlaw rule, interposed and established the doctrine that the mortgage
was but a security for the debt; that the mortgagee held the estate, although forfeited at law, as a trust; and that "the mortgagor had an equity of redemption which he might enforce against
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the mortgagee, as he could any other trust, if he. applied within a
reasonable time to redeem, and offered a full payment of the debt
and of all equitable charges: 5 Story's Eq. Jur. § 1013.
It will be observed that it was the same rigid and technical common-law rule which forfeited the estate of the mortgagor for nonpayment of the debt at the stipulated time and place, and discharged the mortgage by a tender at the stipulated time and place,
the literal enforcement of the terms of the contract without regard
to circumstances. We fail to appreciate why a court of equity,
while interposing its authority to mitigate the rigor or the commonlaw rule against the mortgagor, should at the same time extend
and make more rigorous the rule against the mortgagee. We do
not perceive how this can be said to be in pursuance of the natural
principles of justice. If a tender is made but not accepted, and is
kept good, it is plainly right that the mortgagee should have only
the tender. The mortgagor has been deprived of the use of his
money, and the mortgagee has had ample time to reflect upon his
rights, and has been at liberty to have them, whenever he would,
by the acceptance of the tender. But when the tender is not kept
good, the mortgagor has the use of the money and the mortgagee,
however ill advised he may have been at the time of tender, has no
opportunity for revising and reconsidering his judgment, and thereafter accepting the money tendered.
Where the tender is made at the day, it is made at the time the
parties, by their contract, agreed payment should be made, the
mortgagee may then reasonably be presumed to have anticipated
payment and to have prepared himself to state the account accurately. But a tender after that time may be on one day as well
as on another, after the lapse of years as well as of days, and without any previous notice of the time. In very many cases after the
lapse of a considerable time, where numerous payments have been
made, and the parties through ignorance or carelessness have
omitted to make entries, orto execute and preserve written receipts
thereof; or where the mortgagee has been in possession of the
mortgaged property, and is under obligations to account for rents
and profits, after deducting taxes and necessary repairs, and the
memory is uncertain and confused, it would be very difficult to.
determine at once whether the amount tendered is equal to the
amount actually due.
The first judgment on the question might be very inaccurate and
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yet very honest, and it would not be until by reflection long afterwards, that the inaccuracy would be detected. When it is reflected
that no serious hardship is imposed on a party making a tender
by requiring him to keep it good, it would seem clearly unjust,
under circumstances like those alluded to, to require a party to
whom a tender is made, after the day of payment has passed, to
elect at once to accept or reject it, at the peril of losing his security, if he misjudges as to his rights. An exceptional instance of
injustice that would result from such a rule is found in facts disclosed by this record.
The debt here was due December 10th 1856, and had a tender then
been made, it must have been in coin, and there is not the slightest
grounds for supposing that it would have been rejected. The tender made March 1st 1863, was rejected because it was not in gold,
but was in United States legal tender notes. At the December term
1869, of the Supreme Court of the United States, in Hepburn v.
Griswold, 8 Wallace 603, a majority of the court sustained the
position of McGoon in rejecting the tender, because it was not in
gold, and had the present case been decided before that case was
overruled, the decision must have been in favor of McGoon, on that
ground: MecGoon et al. v. Shirk, 54 11l. 408. Or it would seem
had the tender been made after the decision in that case, and before
the decision in Knox v. Lee, 1 Wallace 457, overruling it, it must
have been held the legal tender was insufficient for the cause assigned by McGoon: Harrisv. Jis et al., 56 N. Y. 421. It could
hardly seem otherwise than harsh and unjust to discharge the mortgage simply because McGoon judged with regard to the sufficiency
of the tender, as did the Supreme Court of the United States in
the first decision, and not as in its last.
The policy of courts of equity is against forfeitures, and in this
state to discharge the mortgage, would be in very many instances
in effect to forfeit the debt. We think the preferable rule is, where
the tender is made after the day the debt secured by the mortgage
is due, to require that it shall be kept good in order that it may
operate to discharge the mortgage. This is in harmony with MZJaywood v. Hunt, 5 Pickering 240; Smith v. Kelly/, 27 Maine 237;
Merritt v. Lambert, 7 Paige 344.
It was Martin's duty when his tender was rejected, to have kept
the money safely, and been ready to pay it when McGoon should
consent to accept it: Stow v. Russell et al., 36 Ill. 33-34. The
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finding of the jury on this question is, in our opinion, authorized
by the evidence. Chancellor Martin, Jr., by whom the tender was
made, says he deposited the money to his credit, in a bank, and endorsed and delivered the certificate thereof to his father, the mortgagor. It appears $800 of this was drawn out April 4th 1863, and
it is not shown that other money was kept ready to supply its place.
Henry S. McGoon testifies that in May 1865, he called upon Crain,
the administrator, for the money due on the note, and that then
Crain told him he could not pay it, but it must be probated against
the estate, and paid in its order with other claims.
Crain, to some extent, contradicts him, but admits that he advised him on the subject of probating the claim, and that he did not
offer to then pay him or say anything about the tender. Without
discussing the relative weight of the testimony of these witnesses,
and without discrediting Crain, it is sufficient to say even his evidence alone is nut sufficient to clearly establish that the tender was
then kept good. Henry S. McGoon, he was informed, was the
assignee of the note. He was also informed that his business then
was to get the money due upon it. If it had all the time been
ready for him, and -was then ready for him, he should have so notified him. The objections to the instructions to the jury are unimportant. Their verdict was advisory only to the court, and since
we are satisfied with the result, it is unimportant by what process
it was reached.
The decree is affirmed.
In considering the operation of a
tender care should be taken to distinguish between the mortgage and the
mortgage debt. The mortgage is instantly and finally discharged, but the
obligation of the debt is not impaired :
Coke Litt. 209 a; Bac. Ab. "Tender,"
F. 330. It is essential therefore both at
law and in equity that a tender should
be kept good in order to stay interest
and save costs : Hume v. Peploh, 8 East
168 ; Wolcott v. Van Srtvoord, 17 John.
253; Gyles v. Hall, 2 P. Wins. 378 ;
Harmerv. Priestly, 16 :Bear. 569 ; Columbia Build. Ass. v. Crump etal., 42
Md. 194 ; Shields v. Lozear, 34 N. J.
504.
At common law a mortgage was regarded as an estate upon condition. A

tender therefore upon the "law day"
necessarily divested the mortgage, because it fully satisfied the condition :
Coke Litt. 209 b ; Corn. Dig. "Condition," L. 4; Bac. Ab. "Tender," F.
330; 4 Kent Com. *193 ; Shields v.
Lozear, supra.
But a tender upon a day subsequent
was without effect, because the condition
was then discharged, and tle estate absolutely vested in the mortgagee by reason of the forfeiture. Under such circumstances, the Statute of Frauds would
not permit either tender or payment to
divest an absolute estate, without the aid
of a legal conveyance : Maywood v.
Hunt, 5 Pick. 240: Currierv. Gale, 9
Allen 522.
In equity, however, the mortgagor
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could still be relieved from the consequences of the legal forfeiture. Upon
payment of the debt the mortgagee was
converted into a trustee for the mortgagor, but a mere tender did not have
this effect : Adams's Eq. *115 ; hields
v. Lozear, supra.
Thus in the case of Postlethwaite v.
Blythe, 2 Swan. *256, a bill was filed
to compel payment, where estates in
Jamaica had been conveyed to trustees,
in trust, inter alia, to raise money for
the payment of a debt due to the plaintiff. By their answer, the defendants,
the trustees, disputed the amount of the
plaintiff's claim, and having paid into
court a sum of 26611. 2s. 3d., they
moved before the Vice Chancellor, that
upon payment into court of the further
sum of 40341. 14s. 3d. (amounting with
the former sum to 66951. 13s. 3d., the
utmost extent of the debt claimed), the
plaintiff might release the estates. The
Vice Chancellor made the order, on
payment into court of an additional sum
for securing the plaintiff's costs. But
upon a subsequent motion the Chancellor
(ELDoe) discharged this order. "I
take it," he said, ' to be contrary to
the whole course of proceeding in this
court, to compel a creditor to part with
his security till he has received his
money. Nothing but consent can authorize me to take the estate from the
plaintiff before payment." Upon this
principle therefore it was held that a
tender would not discharge the lien of a
solicitor, although the money had been
paid into court: Richards v. Platd, Cr.
& Phil. 79 ; s. c., 18 Eng. Ch. R. 79.
At law, however, a tender seems to
have been accorded a more extended
operation in relation to liens than in
equity. "It is a general rule of law,"
said Commissioner DWiGHT (Tiffany v.
S&.John, 65 N. Y. 318), " that where
a person holds a lien upon property, a
tender by the owner of the property of
the amount of the lien will discharge it.
* ** The principle governing the sub-

ject is, that tender is equivalent to payment as to all things which are incidental and accessorial to the debt."
Neither does the rule seem to vary,
whether the lien is created by the act
of the parties : Coggs v. Bernard, 1
Sm. Lead. Cas. *291 ; Anon., 2 Salk.
522 ; Ratcl v. Davies, Cro. Jac. 244;
Com. Dig. " Mort." A; Ball v. &anley, 5 Yerg. (Tenn.) 199 ; Moynahan
v. Moore, 9 Mich. 9 ; or through the
operation of law: Six Carpenters' Case,
8 Coke 146 a; Hunter v. LeCnte, 6
Cow. Z28; Tiffany v. St. John, supra.
Nor does the rule seem to be otherwise
although the stipulated day of payment
has passed : Story on Bail. 346 ; 3
Par. on Cont., 5th ed. 274; Walter v.
Smith, 5 B. & Aid. 439 ; Cortelyou v.
Lansing, 2 Cain. Cas. in Error 200.
In view of this conflict, it is natural
that courts of law should be somewhat
embarrassed when, under the influence
of equitable doctrines, they come to
deal with a mortgage as a security
rather than an estate. It is minifest,
upon principle at least, that if it be
once conceded that payment will discharge the mortgage even after default a tender cannot be denied this
effect, upon the ground that the mortgage interest still continues within the
purview of the Statute of Frauds: Edwards v. Farmers' Fre and Life Ins.
Co. 21 Wend. 467; MeMdlan v. Rickards, 9 Cal. 365-41i. The real question would then seem to be whether
legal or equitable principles shall prevail in dealing with what is now practically regarded as a mere lien or pledge
for the security of a debt.
In Shields v. Lozear, supra, the more
conservative -position was taken that a
tender after default would not discharge
the lien of a mortgage. Said DEPUx,
J., " When a court of law undertakes
to deal- with this equitable estate, it
must do so upon principles of equity
and keep in view the relief which
would be afforded in equity and protect
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the rights of the parties accordingly.
The recognition of this equitable estate
has been obtained in courts of law by
the fiction of regarding the mortgagee
after his debt is satisfied, as a trustee
of the legal estate for the mortgagor.
Until the debt is paid, the legal seizin
of the mortgagee is not a mere formal
title and no trust will be raised for the
benefit of the mortgagor until the purpose for which the mortgage was made
is answered."
But after a long and earnest conflict,
J'ackson v. Crafts, 18 Johns. 110; Merv. Lambert, 7 Paig 344 ; Edward,;
ritt
v. Farmers' Yre Ins. and Loan Co., 21
Wend. 467; Farmers' Fire Ins. and
Loan Co. v. Edwards, 26 Id. 541; Arnot v. Post, 6 Hill 65 ; Post v. Arnot,
2 Denio 344, the New York courts
reached a contrary conclusion in the
leading case of Kortriglht v. Cady, 21
N. Y. 343. Said CosToCK, C. J. :
"1The proposition that a tender of the
money due on a mortgage, made at any
time before a foreclosure, discharges the
lien, is the logical result of premises
which are admitted to be true. These
are, that the mortgagor has the same
right after as before a default to pay his
debt, and so clear his estate from the
encumbrance; and that payment being
actually made, the lien thereby becomes
extinct. We have, then, only to apply
an admitted principle in the law of tender, which is, that tender is equivalent
to payment as to all things which are
incidental and accessorial to the debt.
The creditor, by refusing to accept, does
not forfeit his right to the very thing
tendered, but he does lose all collateral
benefits or securities : 3 Johns. Cas.
243; 12 Johns. 274; 6 Wend. 22; 6
Cowen 728; Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld.
Raym. 916. Thus, after the tender of
a money debt, followed by payment into
court, interest and costs cannot be recovered. The instantaneous effect is to discharge any collateral lien, as a pledge
of goods or the right of distress. It is
not denied that the same principle ap-

plies to a mortgage, if the tender be
made at the very time the money is due.
If the creditor refuses, he justly loses
his security. It is impossible to hold
otherwise, although the tender be made
afterwards, unless we also say that the
mortgage, which was before a mere security, becomes a freehold estate by reason of the default." And see Frost v.
Yonkers Savings Bank, 70 N. Y. 553;
Caruthers v. Humphrey, 12 Mich. 270;
Van Husan v. Kanouse, 13 Id. 303;
ifoore v. Cord, 14 Wis. *213 ; Breitenbach v. Turner, 18 Wis. *140.
In California, however, the courts
declined to follow the lead of the New
York cases, although, it is conceded in
that state, that a mortgage passes no estate in the land : McMillan v. Richards, 9
Cal. 345. "The debtor," said BALDWIN,
J., in Pene v. Castro, 14 Cal. 519, "is as
much in default for not paying when
the debt is due as the creditor is in default for not receiving the money atterward when offered. It would be very
harsh to hold that the debt is lost, the
general effect of losing the security, by
a mere refusal at a particular moment
to receive it, that refusal induced, too,
as it might be, by a variety of circumstances morally excusing it, or at least,
not greatly violative of any positive
duty, and productive of little or no
But, as was
injury to any one."
observed by SAwYnR, J., in Hayes
v. Joseph, 26 Cal. 535, 546 : "To continue a mortgage on foot after a tender
might tie up the mortgaged property and
greatly embarrass the mortgagor in its
full enjoyment, by preventing a sale or
mortgage for other purposes, and thus
great damage might result to him."
See also Muhler v. Nwbaur et al., 32
Cal. 170; Ketchum v. Crippen, 37 Id. 223.
The question, however, was finally
set at rest in that state, and the reasoning
of Pene v. Castro, supra, finally affirmed
in the case of Himnelmanu v. Fitzpatrick,
50 Cal. 650. It should be noticed, however, that a tender in order to discharge
a security should be of the full amount
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due; Graham v. Linden, 50 N. Y. 547 ; can possibly arise. But, whatever may
Bigelow v. Young, 30 Ga. 121, and that be the consequences of refusal, the crethe unconditional acceptance by the ditor may partly charge them to his own
creditor does not at least discharge the folly :" Kortright v. Cady, supra.
debt. "It is settled by many authoIn Haywardv. Munger, 14 Iowa 516,
rities," said BENNETT, J. (Miller v. however, it was doubted whether the
Holden, 18 Vt. 337), "that if a tender creditor is not precluded from recoveris clogged with any conditions, so that ing, when he does not object to the
the taking of the money tendered would amount at the time it is tendered.
constitute an admission by the party And see Graves v. McFarlane, 2 Cold.
that it is in full of his claim, he may for (Tenn.) 167.
this cause reject the tender as being inThe strictness of the New York rule
valid. * * * The reason is, that the party was therefore somewhat modified in it
making the tender has not a right to in- application at least, by CHRISTnANCT,
sist upon the claimant's being concluded J., in Potts v. Plaisted, 30 Mich. 149.
from claiming more than what was ten- "In view," he said "of the serious
dered, by force of any implied admission, consequences to the holder of a mortgrowing out of the reception of the mon- gage upon the refusal of a tender, coney, that the sum tendered was the amount sequences which may often amount to
due to him and that he received it in satis- the absolute loss of the entire debt, and
faction of his claim :" Strong v. Hrvey, in view of the strong temptation which
3 Bing. 304 ; s.c., II Eng. Com. Law must exist to continue merely colorable
153; Jennings v. Major, 8 C. &P. 61 ; or sham tenders, not intended in good
s. c., 34 Eng. Com. Law 610; Hast- faith, the evidence should be so full,
ings v. Thorley, 8 C. & P. 573; s.c.,
clear and satisfactory, as to leave no
34 Eng. Com. Law 899 ; Wills v. -Robb, reasonable doubt that the tender was so
9 Bush 32; Storey v. Krewson et al., 55 made, that the holder must have unInd. 397 ; Wood v.Hitchcock, 20 Wend. derstood it at the time to be a preset,
48; 56 Ill.
453; 3 Phil. on Ev. 378.
absolute and unconditional tender, inIt was therefore held, in the New tended to be in full payment and extinYork cases, that an acceptance of a ten- guishment of the mortgage, and not
der, when the sum was insufficient,
dependent upon his first executing a rewould only discharge the mortgage lien ceipt or discharge, or any other continpro tanto. " It is said," remarked gency. And the holder must in every
COMSTOCK, C. J., "that mortgagees case have a reasonable opportunity to
will be put to great inconvenience, if, look over the mortgage and accompanyat any period, however distant from the ing papers, to calculate and ascertain
time of maturity, they must know the the alnount due; and if such papers are
amount of the debt and accept a tender not present, he must be allowed a reaon peril of losing their security. The sonable time to get them and make the
force of this argument is not perceived. calculation. He cannot be bound under
As a tender must be unqualified by the penalty or at the hazard of losing
any conditions, there can never be his entire debt, to carry at all times, in
any good reason for not accepting the his head, the precise amount due on any
sum offered, whether it be offered when particular day :" Proctor v. Robinson,
it is due or afterwards. By accepting
35 Mich. 284-294; Frost v. Yonkers
the tender, the creditor loses nothing
Savings Bank, supra; Barris v. Jen, 55
and incurs no hazard. If the sum be N. Y. 421. See for a further discussion
insufficient, the security remains. It is of this subject, 2 Jones on -Mortgages,
only by refusing, that any inconvenience
886 to 9033 both inclusive.
VOL. XXVII.-24
J. P. B.
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preme Court of Wisconsin.
HENRY SPIERING v. JULIUS H. ANDRAE.
Words falsely and maliciously charging a public officer with ignorance and
want of capacity to perform properly the duties of an office of profit, and directly
tending to prejudice him therein, are actionable per se.

This was an action for slander. The plaintiff alleged in his
complaint that at the time the alleged slanderous words were
spoken by the defendant, he wis, and for many years previous
thereto had been, a justice of the peace, and acted as such in the
village of Mayville, in the county of Dodge; that the defendant, in
a public speech in said village, at a public meeting, in .the presence
and hearing of a great number of persons, in speaking of the plaintiff as said justice of the peace, maliciously spoke the false and
defamatory words following: 1The reason I did not take out my
second papers was that I did not want to sit as a juror before such
a d-d
fool of a justice." No special damage was alleged in the
complaint. The defendant answered, admitting the speech, but
alleged that the words were not spoken of or concerning the plaintiff, and denies that he used the words " such a 4d fool," but
that the words used were "a d-d
fool of a justice." At the
tial, the defendant objected to the introduction of any evidence on
the part of the plaintiff, for the reason, that the words set out in
the complaint were not actionable. The court sustained the objection, and ordered judgment of nonsuit, with costs, to be entered
against the plaintiff. The plaintiff excepted, and afterwards moved
for a new trial, which was also denied, and the plaintiff excepted.
Judgment was rendered against the plaintiff.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
TAYLOR, J.-The only question is, whether the words set out in
the complaint are actionable per se. The complaint alleges that
the words were spoken of the plaintiff as a justice of the peace,
and we think this claim is sustained by the allegations of the
complaint. The defendant does not simply say of the plaintiff that
he is "a d---d fool," but that he "did not want to sit as a
juror before such a dd fool of a justice." It is clear that the
defendant meant to be understood by this language that he considered the plaintiff an unfit person to exercise the duties of a
justice of the peace, on account of his ignorance and incapacity,
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and that the defendant purposely abstained from becoming - citizen
of the United States, that he might not be compelled to perform
the duties of a juror in a court held by such a fool.
Starkie says, "Words are actionable without proof of special
damage, which directly tend to the prejudice of any one in his
office, profession, trade or business :" Starkie on Slander 110. In
Lansing v. Carpenter, 9 Wis. 541, it is held that words spoken
of an officer, which diminish public confidence in his official integrity, and thus injure him in the business of his office, are actionable. In Gottbelhuet v. lHubahek, 36 Wis. 515, the same rule is
repeated. The present chief justice, in the opinion, says: "We
take it to be an elementary rule, that 'words are actionable which
directly tend to the prejudice of any one in his office, profession,
trade or business.' " That was an action brought for charging the
chief engineer of the fire department of Racine with being drunk
at a fire which it was his duty to extinguish. The case of Well v.
Altenhofen, 26 Wis. 708, is not in conflict with these decisions.
In that case the words were not spoken of the plaintiff in his profession or business.
The words spoken by the defendant at bar, clearly and in most
contemptuous terms charge the plaintiff with a want of capacity to
perform properly the duties of his office, and directly tend to prejudice him therein. There are some cases which hold that charging an officer with mere ignorance and want of capacity to perform
the duties of his office are not actionable per se. Such was the
opinion of Justice NOTT, who delivered the opinion in the case of
-Mayrantv. Rikardson, 1 Nott & t4cO. 347. We think, however, the great preponderance of authority is that words charging an officer with gross ignorance and incapacity are actionable
per se. Such is the opinion of Starkie. See his work on Slander,
4th English ed., 182, 184. Townshend, in his work on the same
subject, sect. 194, says: "It is said, however, that it is actionable
to charge ignorance or unskilfulness, if it amounts to gross ignorance or unskilfulness. This seems only another mode of imputing
such ignorance as unfits the person for the proper exercise of his
art, or of misconduct therein." Again, sect. 196, he says: "As
regards language concerning one in office, the same general principles apply as to language concerning one in trade. Language concerning one in office, which imputes to him a want of integrity or
misfeasance in his office, or a want of capacity generally to fulfil
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the duties of his office, or which is calculated to diminish public con.
fidence in him, or charges him with the breach of some public trust,
is actionable." The following are some of the cases which hold
that words charging an officer with gross ignorance of the duties
of his office or profession are actionable without alleging any special damage: Howe v. Prim, Holt 653; 3 Salk. 694; Day v. Buller, 3 Wils. 59; Onslow v. Home, Id. 186; Peardv. Jones, Cro.
Car. 382; Afaises v. Thornton, 8 Term Rep. 303; Parker v.
Marfue, 1 Sid. 327; White v. Carroll, 42 N. Y. 161; Robins v.
Treadway, 2 J. I. Marsh. (Ky.) 540. In the case of White v. Carroll, supra, the defendant, in speaking of the plaintiff as a physician, called him a "quack."
Justice SUTHEIRLAND, in delivering
the opinion of the court, says -"To call a physician a quack is in
effect charging him with a want of the necessary knowledge and
training to practise the system of medicine which he undertakes to
practise. * * There cannot be any doubt, I think, that to falsely
and maliciously call a physician a quack is actionable."
Certainly the language used by the defendant imputed a want
of capacity and ability on the part of the plaintiff to discharge properly the duties of his office, and was calculated, if believed by his
hearers, to diminish public confidence in him as a justice.
We are not yet prepared to say that the citizen, in the exercise
of his right to criticise the acts and qualifications of those holding
office, may publicly make false and malicious charges as to their
honesty, or their capacity to discharge the duties of the offices held
by them. Though the citizen has the right to criticise those in
office, and a just and truthful criticism may be a wholesome corrective of abuses of official positions, such criticism should be
honest and founded upon truth and not falsehood.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed, and the cause
remanded for a new trial.
Mr. Townshend in his work on Slander
and Libel, lays down the rule, "that,
subject only to the conditions, 1. That
the occupation is one in which a person
may lawfully be engaged; and 2. That
it is an occupation which does, or reasonably may, yield, or may be expected
to yield, pecuniary reward, there is no
employment, call it business, trade, profession or office, or what you will, so
humble or so exalted but that language

which concerns the person in such his
employment will be actionable, if it
affects him therein in a manner that
may, as a necessary consequence, or
does, as a natural or proximate consequence, prevent him [from] deriving
therefrom that pecuniary reward which
probably he might otherwise have obtained :" Townshend on Slander and
Libel,
182; citing, Foudger v. Newcomb, Law Rep. 2 Exch. 327 ; I Stark.
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on Sland. 128 ; Cook on Defamation 21 ;
Ferry v. Hooper, I Lev. 115; Rex v.
Lord Cochrane, 3 M. & S. 10; Sinclair
v. Charles Phillips, 2 B. & P. 363;
and that as respects the occupation of the
plaintiff, "it is now held to be sufficient,
if the person whom the language concerns, habitually (as distinguished from
occasionally) acts in or pursues the
occupation to derive an emolument from
it:" Baboreau v. Farrell, 15 C. B. 360 ;
Bryant v. Loxton, 11 Moore 344;
Davis v. Davis, 1 Nott & McC. 290;
Stark. on Sland. *119.
As to the point that the occupation
must yield a pecuniary reward, Starkie
says that "words which affect a person
in his office generally are actionable,
whether the office be merely confidential
and honorary, or be productive of emolument:" Stark. on Sland. *110, 111.
Mr. Townshend, however, maintains
the contrary doctrine. Towshend on
Slander & Libel, J 184, and cases cited.
Concerning words damaging to one
in his office or profession, the words in
order to be prima facie actionable muss
clearly appear to be spoken of the party,
or to " touch him," in respect to his
office, profession or employment: Stark.
on Slander *119; Cooleyon Torts 201 ;
Townshend on Slander & Libel, 190,
196 ; and if the words counted on do
not by themselves show this, the declaration must contain the necessary averments to connect them: Cooley on
Torts 201 ; Ayre v. Craven, 2 Ad. & B.
7. Unless the language used does
"touch" him in his special character or
relation, its actionable quality must be
determined by the rules which apply to
language concerning an individual as
such: Towshend on Slander & Libel,
190; and in this respect there can be
no doubt of the correctness of the principal case. As examples of this principle the cases of Van Tassel v. Capron,
I Den. 250, and Oaley v. Farrington,
I John. Cas. 129, may be referred to.
In the former the words counted on

were: ,I don't see why 'Squire Van
Tassel did not tell me the execution had
not been returned in time, so that I
could sue the constable and his bail.
There is a combined company here to
cheat strangers, and 'Squire Van Tassel
has a hand in it. K. A., J. G. and
'Squire Van Tassel are a set of d---d
black-legs ;" and in the latter the words
were: "'Squire Oakley is a d--rogue," and in both cases it was held
that the language used imputed misconduct as men and not as magistrates,
and that the words were not actionable
per se. So, it has been considered not
actionable to say of a justice of the
peace that, " he is a logger-headed and a
sloutch-headed, bursen-bellied hound :"
1 Keb. 629 ; though perhaps this opinion
may also be explained on the ground
hereafter to be alluded to, that the office
was one of credit only.
In the case of Mayrant v. Richardson, I Nott & McC. 347, referred to
in the principal case, it was not alleged
that the plaintiff had any office, or that
the words had any relation to his profession or trade. The first count of the
declaration in that case alleged that the
plaintiff was a candidate for Congress
and that the defendant, in conversation
with divers electors of the district,
maliciously and falsely declared and
published of the plaintiff these words :
"He [meaning the said Win. Mayrant] is impaired In his understanding;
his mind is impaired ; his mind is injured by disease ; that Dr. Irvine told
him so; that Dr. Irvine said his mind
was impaired, weakened and could
never be depended on." By reason of
the speaking of which words, plaintiff
lost his election, and particularly the
votes of several individuals mentioned.
The second count stated the writing by
defendant of a certain letter containing
the words : "They [the people] believe
him [plaintiff] to be a true republican,
but from his frequently affected mind they
can't support him for so important a
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situation." The question arose on a
general demurrer to the declaration,
and the demurrer was sustained by both
the inferior and appellate courts. It
will be observed that this case is not
an authority for the proposition that
words charging an officer with mere
ignorance and want of capacity to perform the duties of his office are not
actionable per se, for the plaintiff was
simply a candidate, not an oflcer, and
as to this point the case is a mere dictum. As to the right to canvass the
qualifications of candidates for office,
which was the point decided in the case,
see Townshend on Slander and Libel,
1247 ; Cooley on Coast. Lim. *431,
and cases cited.
In the case of How v. .Prinn,2 Salk.
695; Holt 653 (and see also Regina
v. Wrighten, 2 Salk. 698 ; Starkie on
Slander *111, 112), referred to by the
court in Magrant v. Richardson, the
plaintiff declared that being a justice of
the peace and deputy-lieutenant, and
having served as knight of the shire, &c.,
and intending to stand candidate again,
&c., the defendant, speaking of plaintiff
and his standing candidate, said : "Do
not vote for him for he is a Jacobite, and
for bringing in the Princ of Wales and
popery and to destroy our nation."
Verdict for plaintiff and entire damages.
In arrest of judgment, among other
things, it was objected that the offices recited were not offices of profit as to which
the court say : IcIn offices of profit words
that ;mpute either defect of understanding. of ability, or integrity, are actionsole; but in those of credit, words that
impute want only of ability, are not
actionable (see Townshend on Slander
& Libel, 184), as of a-justice of the
peace: 'He a justice of the peace I
He is an ass, and a beetle-headed justice :' Ratioest, because a man cannot
help his want of ability, as he may
his want of honesty; otherwise where
words impute dishonesty or corruption,
as in this case, where the office is an

office of credit, and the party charged
with inclinations and principles which
show him unfit, and that he ought to be
removed, which is a disgrace." As
respects this case it is to be observed
that it is not an authority upon the
question whether charging an officer
with mere ignorance and want of capacity to perform the duties of his office,
is actionable per se, for the words complained of did not relate to that subject.
And as to the dictuim of the court, it is
favorable to position assumed in the
principal case, for at the present time
the office of justice of the peace, though
perhaps of little credit, is an office of
some profit, in which case the words,
"He ajustice," &c., would come within
the rule laid down by the court and would
undoubtedly be actionable. The rule
laid down in the principal case, that
words charging an officer with gross
Ignorance and incapacity to perform
properly the duties of his office (at least
where the office is one of profit) are
actionable per se, seems well settled.
The cases upon the subject will be found
collected in Townshend on Slander &
Libel, a 193, 196 ; Folkard's Starkie
on Slander *112 ; Cooley on Torts 201.
The following cases touching judges
and attorneys, &c., are referred to as
examples of actionable words -_
Falsely and maliciously to publish of
a judge that "he lacks capacity as a
judge," is actionable: Robbins v.
Treadway, 2 J. J. Marsh. 540.
To say of an attorney : "He bath no
more law than a monkey," is actionable: March's New Cases 60.
To say of an attorney: "He bath no
more law than Mr. C.'s bull, or than a
goose," is actionable: Baker v. Morfue,
1 Sid. 327.
"He cannot read a declaration," with
a colloquium of want of skill, held actionable in Powell v. Jones, 2 Keb. 710;
I Mod. 272.
"What, does he pretend to be a
lawyer ? He is no more a lawyer than
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t:c devil ;" held actionable in Day v. charge was not simply of ignorance and
B'tlfr, 3 Wils. 59.
incapacity : I Roll. Abr. 55.
To say of a barrister : "He is a dunce
The ignorance must, however, be
and will get little by law; he was never charged in general terms, in order to
but accounted a dunce in the Middle render the words actionable per se.
Temple," is actionable: Peardv.Jones Thus it has been held not actionable
Cro. Car. 382.
per se, to say of an attorney in a parTo publish in writing of a barrister ticular suit: "lie knows nothing about
that he is a quack lawyer and mounte- the suit; he will lead you on until he
bank and an imposter, is actionable:
has undone you:" Foot v. Brown, 8
John. 64; Weeks on Attorneys, 139,
11'alley v. Healy, 7 C. B. 591.
An action lies for saying of an utter- and cases cited ; although, as stated in
barrister : "Thou art no lawyer; thou the principal case, quoting from Towncanst not make a lease; thou hast that shend on Slander & Libel, j 194, "it is
degree without desert: they are fools said, however, that it is actionable to
that come to thee for law :" Banks v. charge ignorance or unskilfulness, if it
amounts to gross, ignorance or unskilAllen, I Roll. Abr. 54.
Where a man said of a counsellor at fulness. This seems only another mode
of imputing such ignorance as unfits the
law : "Thou art a daffa-down-dilly,"
it was held actionable; though there person for the proper exercise of his ar,
being an averment that these words or of misconduct therein."
signified that he was an ambidexter, the
MAnsHALL D. EWELL.

United States Circuit Court, Southern Districtof New York.
J. NELSON TAPPAN,

TRUSTEE, ETC.,

MORE

v. THEODORE W. WHITTE-

ET AL.

A debtor who had previously made a general assignment under a state insolvent
law, paid a sum of money to a creditor. Subsequently, under proceedings ia
bankruptcy, a trustee for creditors was appointed, and on a bill filed by him, the
assignment was set aside and the rights of the assignee vested in him. The
trustee then, more than two years after his appointment, and after the payment
had been made to the creditor, brought suit against the latter to recover the money
paid, on the ground that at the time of payment it was the money of the assignee :
fIeld, that the plaintiff could recover, as the cause of action had not accrued to him
until the assignee's title had vested in him under the bill to set aside the assignment, and the statutory limitation had not therefore run at the time the suit was
brought.
It would have been otherwise had the suit been brought merely on plaintiff's
title as trustee in bankruptcy, to recover money paid in fraud of creditors or in
contravention of the bankrupt act ; as in such case the cause of action would have
accrued immediately on plaintiff's appointment as trustee. '

ON demurrer.

The case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Abbott Brothers, for plaintiff.
Edward B. Merrill, for defendants.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by
WALLACE, J.-This case presents the single question whether

upon the facts alleged in the complaint, which are admitted to be
true, the defence of the statutory limitation of actions prescribed
by section 5057 Revised Statutes of the United States, can prevail.
That section provides that "no suit, either at law or in equity,
shall be maintainable in any court between an assignee in bankruptcy, and a person claiming an adverse interest touching any
property or rights of property transferable to or vested in such
assignee, unless brought within two years from the time when the
cause of action accrued for or against such assignee."
The complaint shows that the plaintiff was appointed and confirmed as trustee'in bankruptcy of the estate of Archibald Baxter
& Co., bankrupts, and as such trustee received an assignment of
their estate on the 28th day of March 1876. On the 26th day of
April 1878, the plaintiff brought the present suit to recover
62500 paid by the bankrupts to the defendants on the 9th day
of August 1875.
The complaint does not allege that the sum thus paid was paid in
contravention of the bankrupt act, or in fraud of the creditors of
Baxter & Co., but alleges that in fact the money belonged to one
Dwight Johnson, to whom Baxter & Co. had made a general assignment of all their property, in trust for creditors, two days before
the payment, and that when the defendants received the money
they had knowledge of the assignment, and that the money belonged
to Johnson.
Upon these facts it seems quite clear that the cause of action did
not accrue to the plaintiff at the time when, as trustee, he received
an assignment of the bankrupt's estate. He could not at that time
have maintained an action against the -defendant. Of course the
bankrupts had no right of action to recover the money back, and
the plaintiff, as trustee, acquired no better right than the bankrupts had, ejeept as to property conveyed in fraud of creditors,
or money or property transferred in contravention of the bankrupt act. The money which was received by the defendants was
not the money of 'Baxter & Co., but that of Johnson, and no
one except Johnson could have recovered it of the defendants.
Subsequently the plaintiff became vested with the cause of action. As appears by the complaint, he filed a bill to set aside the
general assignment from Baxter & Co. to Johnson as a transfer in
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contravention of the bankrupt act, and as void as to the plaintiff,
because made with a view to prevent the property of the assignors
from being distributed under the bankrupt act. And on the 15th
day of May 1877, a decree was rendered in that action, setting aside
the assignment as to the plaintiff. By force of this decree, and a
transfer made in obedience to it, all the property and rights of action which had passed to Johnson under the general assignment
became vested in the plaintiff. Then, and not until then, the plaintiff was in position to maintain an action against defendants for the
money, which, under the assignment belonged to Johnson, but
which the defendants had received without authority from Johnson.
Then, and not until then, the cause of action accrued for the
trustee. The statute begins to run only from the time when the
assignee has a cause of action upon which he can bring suit. It is
a statute to enforce vigilance and promptitude on the part of the
assignee, and neither its language nor the object it is designed to
effect, authorizes a construction which might deprive an assignee
from enforcing a claim because two years may have elapsed before
he has become vested with the right of action. If, in the present
case, the trustee had failed without any fault or want of diligence
on his part to obtain the decree setting aside the assignment until
two years had elapsed, under the construction claimed by the defendants, he could not have maintained an action but would have
been met and defeated by the statutory bar.
Thus he would be barred of his action although he never had a
cause of action. This surely cannot be the intent of the statute.
While the cause of action arose when the money was received ty
the defendants it did not accrue to the trustee until he could avail
himself of it.
If it had appeared that Baxter & Co. paid the money to the defendants in contravention of the bankrupt act, or in fraud of the
creditors, a different result would follow, because in such a case the
plaintiff could have maintained an action against the defendants as
soon as he was appointed trustee, and received an assignment of the
bankrupt's estate, and Johnson's title to the money would not have
stood in his way. In such a case the plaintiff would not have derived title through Johnson or through the assignment, but through
the statute, which invested him with the right of action to recover
all property conveyed by the bankrupt in fraud of his creditors or
in fraud of the provisions of the bankrupt act (sections 5046, 5128,
VoL.XXVII.-25
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Rev. Statutes U. S.), and the defendants could not have interposed
the assignment, and Johnson's title under it, as a defence, because
as against thelissignment was void.
Undoubtedly, when the assignment was set aside at the suit of
the trustee in bankruptcy, the title of the trustee related back to the
time of the assignment. But the doctrine of relation is never applied to defeat a remedy, and cannot be invoked to subject the
plaintiff to a disability which otherwise would not exist.
Judgment is ordered for the plaintiff.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
FRANK HAUSMAN v.A. T. NYE ET AL.
Where one purchases a number of articles at one time and by the same contract,
he is not obliged to accept any unless all be delivered.
A delivery to a common carrier, not selected or designated by the purchaser, is
not such a delivery or acceptance of goods as will take the contract out of the
Statute of Frauds.
Whether such a delivery, in the case of a contract valid in itself, might be sufficient to transfer the title and risk to the purchaser, qucere.

ON error to Daviess Circuit Court.
This was an action for the price of a number of stoves, purchased
by defendant, but which he refuted to receive, on the ground that his
whole order was not filled. The court below gave judgment for
the plaintiff. The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion.
Mason & Bynum and Burns & Burns, for appellant.
Gardiner Armstrong, for appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PERIKINS, J.-The contract in the case between the plaintiff
and the defendant, embraced all the articles in the bill of particulars sued on and others in addition. One of the plaintiffs in
his testimony said: "I shipped the goods, as per Mr. Hausman's
order, to Scott, with the exception of three number seven Charm
heating stoves, which we could not at that time ship, as they were
not then on hand." The defendant below, Hausman, in his
testimony stated that "he ordered other goods at the same time,
viz.: ordered three number seven Charm heating stoves but they
did not come. I ordered all these goods at one time, and would
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not have ordered part without the rest. I needed the stoves which
did not come in my business."
The contract was an entire contract for the whole of the bill of
goods ordered, and the defendant, Hausman, was not obliged to
accept the part shipped: Smith v. Lewis, 40 Ind. 98.
Again, the contract was void by the Statute of Frauds. Itwas an
Indiana contract made at Washington, in this state, between the
defen dant, Hausman, and Sanford W. Scott, agent of the plaintiff,
with full power to make the same a finality: Kiewert v. Myers, 61 or
62 Ind. (not yet reported). Our statute reads thus: "No contract
for the sale of any goods, for the price of fifty dollars or more,
shall be valid, unless the purchaser shall receive part of such
property or shall give something in earnest to bind the bargain, or
in part payment, or unless some note or memorandum in writing
of the bargain be made and signed by the party to be charged
thereby, or by some person thereunto by him lawfully authorized."
In this case the contract was for the price of over fifty dollars ;
no part of the property was received by the purchaser; no earnest
was given to bind the bargain or in part payment, and no note or
memorandum signed by the party to be charged or his lawfully
authorized agent was made.
It is claimed that there was a delivery and acceptance of the
goods under contract. Scott, the agent of the plaintiffs, testified
touching the contract as follows : "In behalf of the plaintiffs, some
time in September, A. D. 1874, I sold to Mr. Frank Hausman two
number two Onega stoves at $10 each; two number three Onega
stoves at $15 each; two number seven Alladine cook stoves, with
ware, at $11 each; three number seven Charm heating stoves at
$4.50 each; three number eight Charm heating stoves at $5.50
each. The terms of sale were ninety days credit. The freight
was to be paid by plaintiffs to Cincinnati, and the goods to be
shipped at the defendant's risk."
Hausman, the defendant, testified: "It was agreed when I
ordered the goods that the plaintiffs should ship them from Mfarietta,
Ohio, to Washington, Indiana, and that they should pay the freight
to Cincinnati, Ohio, and I the rest of the way. •Nothing was said
by either him or me about shipping the goods at my risk."
As to the manner of the shipment made of the goods, Mr. Nye,
one of the plaintiffs, testified : "The plaintiffs delivered the goods in
the said invoice mentioned upon the wharf-boat of Hall & Bert,
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steamboat agents and owners of the Marietta wharf-boat at Marietta,
Ohio, marked and directed plainly to Frank Hausman, Washington, Daviess County, Indiana, consigned to the Ohio & Mississippi
Railroad, Cincinnati, Ohio. Bills of lading were taken, one of
which was sent to Hausman."
Nothing was said between the parties at the time of the contract
or afterwards as to the manner or route or vessel in or by which
the goods were to be shipped, nor as to the carrier to whom they
were to be delivered. The bill of lading signed by Hall & Bert
recited a shipment of goods by Nye & Son "on board the good
steamboat ' Chesapeake' to be delivered at the port in Cincinnati
unto the Ohio & Mississippi Railroad Company or assigns, they
paying freight, &c. Marked, Frank Hausman, Washington, Ind."
The contract, as we have said, was an Indiana contract and void
under the Statute of Frauds. It was not executed by what was done
in Marietta, Ohio, claimed to have constituted a delivery and acceptance, or rather, as the statute requires, a reception by the purchaser of the goods or a part thereof: 1. Because the contract was
entire for the delivery of all the goods or none. The delivery of a
part to a carrier in the absence and without the knowledge of the
vendee, could be no delivery under and pursuant'to the contract;
2. A delivery to a carrier, not named by the vendee, was not a
delivery to the vendee.
It was once held that a delivery to a common carrier, not
selected by the purchaser by the latter's direction, was an acceptance by the purchaser within the statute : Hart v. Sattley, 3 Camp.
528. But this case has not been followed in later cases: Spencer
v. H ae, 30 Vt. 314. In Rodgers v. Phillips,40 N. Y. Court of
App. 519, it is decided that, "'Upon a verbal contract for the sale
of goods for more than fifty dollars in value, a delivery of them, in
accordance with such contract, to a general carrier, not designated
nor selected by the buyer, does not constitute such a delivery or
acceptance, under the Statute of Frauds, as to pass the title to the
goods ;" although, in the case of a contract itself valid, such a delivery might be sufficient to transfer the title and risk to the purchaser.
But it is not necessary that we should express an opinion upon
this point. See Strong v. Dodds, 47 Vt. 348. Also, on the
general subject, the elaborate case of Bacon v. Eccles, 43 Wisconsin 227; Allard v. Greasart,61 New York 1. In Lloyd v.
Wrigt, 20 Geo. 574, it is said, in the opinion of the court:
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"Under the proof, was this case within the 17th section of the
Statute of Frauds ? The statute requires that the purchaser shall
'actually receive' the goods. But although goods are forwarded to
him by a carrier by his direction, or delivered abroad, or on board
of a ship chartered by him, still there is no actual acceptance to
satisfy the act, so long as the buyer continues to have the right either
to object to the quantum or quality of the goods." See also Chitty on
Contracts 392; Story on Contracts 881, 383; Acebal v. Levj, 10
Bingham 376; How v. Palmer, 2 B. & A. 321; iSheard v.
Prassy, 32 N. H. 49.
In Maxwell v. Brown, 89 Me. 98, the court say: "From the
language of this statute, it is apparent that, when there is no written contract, a mere delivery will not be sufficient. There must
further be an acceptance by the purchaser, else he will not be
bound." In Baldey v. Parker, 2 B. & C. 37, it was formerly
considered, observed BEST, J., "that a delivery of the goods by
the seller was sufficient to take a case out of the 17th section of
the Statute of Frauds; but it is now clearly settled that there must
be an acceptance by the buyer as well as a delivery by the seller."
In the same case HOLROYD, J., said: "As long as the seller
preserves his control over the goods so as to retain his lien, he prevents the vendee from accepting and receiving them as his own
within the meaning of the statute."
JudgeWRIGHT, in Shindlerv.Houston, 1 Comstock (N. Y.), p. 299,
says: "The best considered cises hold that there must be a vesting of the possession of the goods in the vendee as absolute owner,
discharged of all liens for the price on the part of the vendor, and an
ultimate acceptance and receiving of the property by the vendee so
unequivocal that he should have precluded himself from taking any
objection to the quantities or quality of the goods sold." See .Kirby
v. Johnson, 22 Mo. 354; .iewart v. Myers, supra; H'ewes
v. Jordan, 39 Md. 472 ; Hooker v. Knob, 26 Wis. 511 ; Stone v.
Browning, 51 N. Y. 211; Gibbs v. Benjamin, 13 Am. Law Reg.
(N. S.) 93 and note; Stone v. Browning, 68 N. Y. 598; Edwards
v.G. T. Railroad Co., 54 Me. 105; Johnson v. Celter, 105
Mass. 447.
In the case at bar the contractwas void by the Statute of Frauds.
There was no acceptance of the goods by the purchaser.
The judgment is reversed with costs, and the cause remanded for
a new trial.

